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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MOSELL EQUITIES, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company,

Supreme Court Case No. 41338

Plaintiff-Respondent,
VS.

BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an
Idaho corporaton, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III
and AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and
as husband and wife,
Defendants-Appellants.

CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada.

HONORABLE DENNIS E. GOFF

DANIEL E. WILLIAMS

ERIC R. CLARK

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

BOISE, IDAHO

EAGLE, IDAHO

000001

-

-

In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho

MOSELL EQUITIES, LLC, an Idaho limited

)

liability company.

)

Pia inti ff-Respondent
V

)
)
)
)

ORDER AUGMENTING APPEAL
Supreme Court Docket T\o. 41338-2013
Ada County No. 2009-9974

)

BERRYHILL & COMPANY. INC.. an Idaho
corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and

)
)

AMY BERRYHILL, individually. and as
husband and '-Vifo.

)
)
)

Defondants-Appellants.

)

A Clerk 1s Record and Reporter 1s Transcript was filed Decemher 21. 201 I. in appeal
\lo. 38338, Moscll equities V. Berryhill: therefore, good cause appearing.

IT I IER EBY IS ORDERED that the Appeal Record rn this case shall be
AUGMENTED to include the Court Fik, Reporter's Transcript, and Clerk's Record filed in prior
appeal No. 37338.

Ir FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Clerk shall pn:pare and file a
LIMITED CLERKS RECORD with this Court, which shall contain the documents rcquestrd in the
Notice of Appeal, together with a copy of this Order, but shall not duplicate any document included
in the Clerk's Record filed in prior appeal No. 38338.
IT FURTHER JS ORDERED that the District Court Reporter shall prepare and

lodge a SUPPLEMENTAL REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT with the District Court. \Vhich .-,hail
contain the proceedings requested in the Notice of Appeal, but shall not duplicate any proceedings
included in the Reporter's Transcript filed in prior appeal No. 38338. The LIMITED CLERK'S
RECORD and REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT shall be filed with this Court after settlement.

ORDER AUGMENTING APPEAL··· Docket No. 41338-2013
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DATED this

/Otlt

day of September, 2013.

Fo?he Supreme Court

ienw.·e~~
cc:

Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
District Court Reporter
District Court Judge

'

. · ......

~.~-

- , ... _.;;_,,
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Date: 10/25i2013

User: CCTHIEBJ

Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County

Time: 02:48 PM

ROA Report

Pqge 1 of 11

Case: CV-OC-2009-09974 Current Judge: Darla S. Williamson
Mosen Equities LLC vs. Berryhill _Company Inc, etal.

Mosell Equities LLC vs. Berryhill & Company Inc, John E Berryhill Ill, Amy Berryhill
Date

Code

User

5/28/2009

NCOC

CCGARDAL

New Case Filed - Other Claims

Patricia Young

COIVIP

CCGARDAL

Complaint Filed

Patricia Young

SMFI

CCGARDAL

Summons Filed

Patricia Young

AFOS

CCGDULKA

Affidavit Of Service (06/03/09)

Cheri C. Copsey

NOAP

CCHOLMEE

Notice Of Appearance (Williams for Berryhill &
Company Inc, John e Berryhill Ill and Amy
Berryhill)

Cheri C. Copsey

MOTN

CCHOLMEE

Motion for Disqualification of Judge Without
Cause

Cheri C. Copsey

ORDQ

CCNELSRF

Order Granting Motion for Disqualification of
Judge w/o Cause

Cheri C. Copsey

CJWO

CCNELSRF

Change Assigned Judge: Disqualification W/O
Cause

Darla S. Williamson

NOTC

CCNELSRF

Notice of Reassignment to Judge Darla
Williamson

Darla S. Williamson

MOTN

CCHOLMEE

Motion to Dismiss

Darla S. Williamson

MEMO

CCHOLMEE

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss

Darla S. Williamson

MOTN

CCHOLMEE

Motion for a Protective Order

Darla S. Williamson

AFFD

CCHOLMEE

Affidavit of Daniel E Williams Re: Motion

Darla S. Williamson

MEMO

CCHOLMEE

Memorandum in Support of Motion

Darla S. Williamson

NOTH

CCPRICDL

Notice Of Hearing on Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss and Motion for Protective Order

Darla S. Williamson

HRSC

CCPRICDL

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/22/2009 02:45
Darla S. Williamson
PM) Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Protective
Order

7/10/2009

RSPS

CCAMESLC

Response to Motion to Dismiss and Motion for
Protective Order

Darla S. Williamson

7/20/2009

RPLY

CCSIMMSM

Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss

Darla S. Williamson

7/22/2009

DCHH

DCKORSJP

Hearing result for Motion held on 07/22/2009
02:45 PM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Penny Tardiff
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Less than 100 Pages Motion to
Dismiss and Motion for Protective Order

Darla S. Williamson

9/14/2009

AMCO

CCRANDJD

Amended Complaint Filed

Darla S. Williamson

MOTN

CCRANDJD

Motion to Reconsider the Courts Dismissal of
John and Amy Berryhill

Darla S. Williamson

MEMO

CCRANDJD

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider Darla S. Williamson

MOTN

CCWRIGRM

Mosell Equities Motion to Compel Responses and Darla S. Williamson
Requests

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Affidavit of Counsel

Darla S. Williamson

9/22/2009

HRSC

MCBIEHKJ

Notice of Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel
10/14/2009 02:45 PM)

Darla S. Williamson

9/28/2009

AFFD

MCBIEHKJ

Affidavit of Daniel E Williams

Darla S. Williamson
000004

6/8/2009

6/16/2009

7/1/2009

7/6/2009

9/21/2009

Judge
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Case: CV-OC-2009-09974 Current Judge: Darla S. Williamson
Masell Equities LLC vs. Berryhill Company Inc, etal.

Masell Equities LLC vs. Berryhill & Company Inc, John E Berryhill 111, Amy Berryhill
Date

Code

User

9/29/2009

NOTH

CCPRICDL

Notice Of Hearing on Motion to Reconsider the
Courts Dismissal of Defendants John and Amy
Berryhill

10/6/2009

OB.IE

CCHOLMEE

Objection to the Defendants Renewed Motion for Darla S. Williamson
Protective Order

10/7/2009

MEMO

CCGARDAL

Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider

10/14/2009

DCHH

DCKORSJP

Hearing result for Motion to Compel held on
Darla S. Williamson
10/14/2009 02:45 PM: District Court Hearing Hele
Court Reporter: Penny Tardiff
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Less than 100 Pages and Motion for
Reconsider the Courts Dismissal

HRSC

DCKORSJP

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss
11/18/2009 02:45 PM)

Darla S. Williamson

10/15/2009

NOTS

CCSIMMSM

Notice Of Service

Darla S. Williamson

10/29/2009

HRVC

DCTHERTL

Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss held on
11/18/2009 02:45 PM: Hearing Vacated

Darla S. Williamson

NOHG

CCTOWNRD

Notice Of Hearing

Darla S. Williamson

HRSC

CCTOWNRD

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss
12/02/2009 02:45 PM) 2nd Motion

Darla S. Williamson

MOTN

MCBIEHKJ

Second Motion to Dismiss

Darla S. Williamson

NOID

MCBIEHKJ

Notice Of Intent To Take Default

Darla S. Williamson

MOTN

CCAMESLC

Motion to Strike Three Day Notice of Intent to
Take Default and Default Judgment

Darla S. Williamson

AFSM

CCAMESLC.

Affidavit In Support Of Motion to Strike and Take
Default

Darla S. Williamson

MEMO

CCAMESLC

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike and
take Default

Darla S. Williamson

11/9/2009

NOTC

MCBIEHKJ

Notice of Hearing ( 12/2/09 @ 2:45 PM)

Darla S. Williamson

11/10/2009

AFFD

CCBOURPT

Affidavit of Eric Clark Filed in Opposition to
Defendants Motion to Strike Plaintiff's ThreeDay
Notice of Intent to take Default and Filed in
Support of Plaintiff's Motions for Sanctions

Darla S. Williamson

RSPS

CCBOURPT

Response to Defendants' Motion to Strike
Plaintiff's Three Day Notice of INtent to take
Default and Default Judgment and Motion for
Sactions

Darla S. Williamson

11/18/2009

MEMO

CCAMESLC

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss

Darla S. Williamson

11/25/2009

RSPS

CCDWONCP

Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Second
Motion to Dismiss

Darla S. Williamson

11/30/2009

NOTS

MCBIEHKJ

Notice Of Service

Darla S. Williamson

REPL

CCLATICJ

Defendant's Reply Brief in Support of Second
Motion to Dismiss

Darla S. Williamson

AFFD

CCLATICJ

Affidavit of Daniel E. Williams Re Plaintiff's Motion Darla S. Williamson
for Sanctions
000005

11/3/2009

11/6/2009

Judge
Darla S. Williamson

Darla S. Williamson
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Case: CV-OC-2009-09974 Current Judge: Darla S. Williamson
Masell Equities LLC vs. Berryhill Company Inc, etal.

Masell Equities LLC vs. Berryhill & Company Inc, John E Berryhill Ill, Amy Berryhill
Date

Code

User

11/30/2009

MEMO

CCLATICJ

Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Three-Day Notice of
Intent to Take Default and in Opposition to
Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions

12/2/2009

DCHH

DCKORSJP

Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss held on
Darla S. Williamson
12/02/2009 02:45 PM: District Court Hearing Hel1
Court Reporter: Penny Tardiff
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Less than 100 Pages 2nd Motion

12/4/2009

DEOP

CCCHILER

Memorandum Decision and Order Re:
Defendants' Second Motion to Dismiss and
Motion to Strike Three Day Notice of Intent to
Take Default

Darla S. Williamson

12/10/2009

NOTS

CCWRIGRM

Notice Of Service

Darla S. Williamson

12/15/2009

HRSC

DCKORSJP

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 06/21/2010 08:30 Darla S. Williamson
AM)

DCKORSJP

Notice of Trial Setting and Order Governing
Further Proceedings

Judge
Darla S. Williamson

Darla S. Williamson

12/21/2009

ANSW

CCAMESLC

Answer and Counterclaim (Williams for Berryhill & Darla S. Williamson
Co, John and Amy Berryhill)

12/24/2009

NOSV

CCGARDAL

Notice Of Service

Darla S. Williamson

1/5/2010

NOTO

CCTOWI\IRD

Notice Of Taking Deposition

Darla S. Williamson

1/11/2010

NOSV

CCHOLMEE

Notice Of Service

Darla S. Williamson

1/15/2010

STIP

MCBIEHKJ

Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning

Darla S. Williamson

NOTS

CCWRIGRM

Notice Of Service

Darla S. Williamson

1/22/2010

RPLY

CCLATICJ

Reply to Counterclaim and Demand for Jury Trial Darla S. Williamson
(Clark for Masell Equities)

3/1/2010

NOTO

MCBIEHKJ

Notice Of Taking Deposition

Darla S. Williamson

3/11/2010

NOTO

MCBIEHKJ

Notice Of Taking Deposition

Darla S. Williamson

3/12/2010

MOTN

CCTOWNRD

Motion to Quash Notice of Deposition

Darla S. Williamson

NOHG

CCTOWNRD

Notice Of Hearing

Darla S. Williamson

HRSC

CCTOWNRD

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/07/2010 02:45
PM) Motion to Quash

Darla S. Williamson

3/16/2010

NOTO

CCTOWNRD

Notice Of Taking Deposition

Darla S. Williamson

3/17/2010

NOTS

MCBIEHKJ

Notice Of Service

Darla S. Williamson

3/22/2010

MOTN

CCSULLJA

Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

Darla S. Williamson

MEMO

CCSULLJA

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment

Darla S. Williamson

AFFD

CCSULLJA

Affidavit of Glenn Masell

Darla S. Williamson

NOTH

CCWRIGRM

Notice Of Hearing (04/21/10@ 2:45pm)

Darla S. Williamson

HRSC

CCWRIGRM

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
04/21/2010 02:45 PM) Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment

Darla S. Williamson

MOSJ

CCWRIGRM

Defendants Motion For Summary Judgment

000006
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Case: CV-OC-2009-09974 Current Judge: Darla S. Williamson
Mosell Equities LLC vs. Berryhill Company Inc, etal.

Mosell Equities LLC vs. Berryhill & Company Inc, John E Berryhill Ill, Amy Berryhill
Date

Code

User

3/22/2010

MEMO

CCWRIGRM

Defendants Memorandum in Support of Motion

Darla S. Williamson

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Affidavit of John E Berryhill

Darla S. Williamson

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Affidavit of Daniel E Williams

Darla S. Williamson

NOTH

CCWRIGRM

Notice Of Hearing (04/21/10@ 2:45pm)

Darla S. Williamson

MOTN

MCBIEHKJ

Motion to Compel

Darla S. Williamson

AFFD

MCBIEHKJ

Affidavit of Daniel E Williams

Darla S. Williamson

MEMO

MCBIEHKJ

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel

Darla S. Williamson

HRVC

DCKORSJP

Hearing result for Motion held on 04/07/2010
02:45 PM: Hearing Vacated Motion to Quash

Darla S. Williamson

NOTO

MCBIEHKJ

(2)Notice Of Taking Deposition

Darla S. Williamson

MOTI\I

CCBOYIDR

Motion to Amend Complaint to Include a Claim for Darla S. Williamson
Punitive Damages

MEMO

CCBOYIDR

Memorandum Filed in Support of it's Motion to
Amend Complaint to add a Claim for Punitive
Damages

Darla S. Williamson

RSPN

CCBOYIDR

Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment

Darla S. Williamson

OBJE

CCBOYIDR

*****Objection to Excerpts of the Affidavits of Gery Darla S. Williamson
W. Edson, Robert A Renteria, and David C.
Cooper****** (Pleading Entered in Error, Pleading
Belongs in Case CVOC0915884)

AFFD

CCBOYIDR

Affidavit of Glenn E. Mosell Filed in Oppostion to
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

NOHG

CCBOYIDR

Notice Of Hearing (Motion to Amend Complaint to Darla S. Williamson
Include a Claim for Punitive Damages 4-21-10@
2:45 PM)

MEMO

CCBOURPT

Memorandum of Defendant in Opposition to
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

Darla S. Williamson

AFFD

CCBOURPT

Affidavit In Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for
partial Summary Judgment

Darla S. Williamson

4/9/2010

NOTD

MCBIEHKJ

Notice Of Taking Deposition

Darla S. Williamson

4/13/2010

STIP

DCKORSJP

Stipulated Protective Order

Darla S. Williamson

4/14/2010

REPL

CCMASTLW

Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment

Darla S. Williamson

MOTN

CCMASTLW

Motion for Protective Order

Darla S. Williamson

MEMO

CCMASTLW

Memorandum in Support

Darla S. Williamson

MOTN

CCMASTLW

Motion to Strike

Darla S. Williamson

MEMO

CCMASTLW

Memorandum in Support

Darla S. Williamson

REPL

CCMASTLW

Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment

Darla S. Williamson

MOTN

CCMASTLW

Motion to Strike

Darla S. Williamson

MEMO

CCMASTLW

Memorandum in Support

Darla S. Williamson

3/26/2010

4/7/2010

Judge

Darla S. Williamson
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Case: CV-OC-2009-09974 Current Judge: Darla S. Williamson
IVlosell Equities LLC vs. Berryhill Company Inc, etal.

Masell Equities LLC vs. Berryhill & Company Inc, John E Berryhill Ill, Amy Berryhill
Date

Code

User

4/14/2010

MEMO

CCMASTLW

Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Amend
Complaint

Darla S. Williamson

4/20/2010

MEMO

MCBIEHKJ

Memorandum Filed in Oppositioin to Motion to
Strike

Darla S. Williamson

REPL

MCBIEHKJ

Reply Memorandum Filed in Support of Motion to Darla S. Williamson
Amend Complaint

NOTD

MCBIEHKJ

Notice Of Taking Deposition

Darla S. Williamson

MOTN

CCLATICJ

Motion to Supplement Record on Summary
Judgment

Darla S. Williamson

AFFD

CCLATICJ

Affidavit of Daniel E. Williams re Motion to
Supplement Record on Summary Judgment

Darla S. Williamson

MEMO

CCLATICJ

Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiffs Motion to Strike the Affidavit of John E.
Berryhill Ill

Darla S. Williamson

4/21/2010

DCHH

DCKORSJP

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
Darla S. Williamson
04/21/2010 02:45 PM: District Court Hearing Hele
Court Reporter: Penny Tardiff
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Less than 100 Pages Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment and Motion for
Summary Judgment

4/27/2010

ORDR

DCKORSJP

Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Compel

Darla S. Williamson

4/29/2010

NOTS

MCBIEHKJ

Notice Of Service

Darla S. Williamson

4/30/2010

DEOP

DCKORSJP

Memorandum Decision & Order Re: Cros
Motions for Summary Judgment, Motions to
Strike, Motion to Amend Complaint & Motion to
Compel

Darla S. Williamson

5/7/2010

NOSV

CCHOLMEE

Notice Of Service

Darla S. Williamson

5/12/2010

MOTN

MCBIEHKJ

Motion for Sanctions and to Vacate Trial Setting

Darla S. Williamson

AFFD

MCBIEHKJ

Affidavit of Daniel E Williams

Darla S. Williamson

NOTS

MCBIEHKJ

Notice Of Service

Darla S. Williamson

AFFD

MCBIEHKJ

Affidavit of Counsel Filed in Opposition to Motion
for Sanctions

Darla S. Williamson

AFFD

CCRANDJD

Second Affidavit of Daniel Williams re Motion for
Sanctions and to Vacate Trial Setting

Darla S. Williamson

MOTN

CCRANDJD

Motion to Shorten Time for Hearing on Motion for Darla S. Williamson
Sanctions and to Vacate Trial Setting

AFSM

CCRANDJD

Affidavit In Support Of Motion

Darla S. Williamson

NOHG

CCRANDJD

Notice Of Hearing re Motion to Shorten Time
(05.19.10@2:45pm)

Darla S. Williamson

HRSC

CCRANDJD

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 05/19/2010 02:45
PM) Motion to Shorten Time on Motion for
Sanctions

Darla S. Williamson

ORDR

DCKORSJP

Order Granting Motion to Shorten Time for
Hearing on Defs Motion for Sanctions & to
Vacate Trial Setting

Darla S. Williamson

5/13/2010

5/14/2010

5/17/2010

Judge

000008
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Case: CV-OC-2009-09974 Current Judge: Darla S. Williamson
Mosell Equities LLC vs. Berryhill _Company Inc, etal.

Mosell Equities LLC vs. Berryhill & Company Inc, John E Berryhill Ill, Amy Berryhill
Date

Code

User

5/18/2010

MEMO

CCMCLILI

Plaintiffs Memorandum in Response to
Defendants Motion for Sanctions & to Vacate
Trial Setting

MOTN

CCMCLILI

Mosell Equities' Motion to Compel Responses to Darla S. Williamson
Plaintiffs Third Set of Requests for Production of
Documents

AFFD

CCMCLILI

Affidavit of Counsel Filed in Support of Mosell
Darla S. Williamson
Equities' Motion to Compel Responses to
Plaintiffs Third Set of Requests for Production of
Documents

MEMO

CCMCLILI

Memorandum in Support of Mosell Equities'
Motion to Compel Responses to Plaintiffs Third
Set of Requests for Production of Documents

Darla S. Williamson

NOHG

CCLATICJ

Notice Of Hearing re Mosell Equities' Motion to
Compel Discovery (06/09/10@ 2:45 pm)

Darla S. Williamson

HRSC

CCLATICJ

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel
06/09/2010 02:45 PM)

Darla S. Williamson

DCHH

DCKORSJP

Hearing result for Motion held on 05/19/2010
02:45 PM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: No Court Reporter
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Less than 100 Pages Motion to
Shorten Time on Motion for Sanctions

Darla S. Williamson

HRVC

DCKORSJP

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 06/21/2010
08:30 AM: Hearing Vacated

Darla S. Williamson

HRSC

DCKORSJP

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 08/02/2010 08:30 Darla S. Williamson
AM)

DCKORSJP

Notice of Trial Setting and Order Governing
Further Proceedings

NOHG

CCSIMMSM

Supplemental Notice Of Hearing (Motion to
Darla S. Williamson
Compel of Plaintiff's First, Second, and Third Sets
of Discovery Requests

MOTN

CCSULLJA

Mosell Equities' Motion to Compel Responses to
Plaintiffs First and Second Set of Interrogatories
and Requests for Production of Documents to
Defendants

Darla S. Williamson

AFFD

CCSULLJA

Affidavit of Counsel Filed in Support of Mosell
Equities' Motion to Compel Responses to
Plaintiffs First and Second Set of Interrogatories
and Requests for Production of Documents to
Defendants

Darla S. Williamson

MEMO

CCSULLJA

Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Mosell
Equities' Motion to Compel Responses to
Plaintiffs First and Second Set of Interrogatories
and Requests for Production of Documents to
Defendants

Darla S. Williamson

5/26/2010

NOTS

MCBIEHKJ

Notice Of Service

Darla S. Williamson

6/2/2010

MOTN

CCGARDAL

Motion to Amend Complaint

Darla S. Williamson

MEMO

CCGARDAL

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend

5/19/2010

5/21/2010

5/25/2010

Judge
Darla S. Williamson

Darla S. Williamson

000009
Darla S. Williamson
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Case: CV-OC-2009-09974 Current Judge: Darla S. Williamson
Mosell Equities LLC vs. Berryhill Company Inc, etal.

Mosell Equities LLC vs. Berryhill & Company Inc, John E Berryhill Ill, Amy Berryhill
Date

Code

User

6/2/2010

NOHG

CCGARDAL

Notice Of Hearing 6.30.10 @ 2:45pm

Darla S. Williamson

HRSC

CCGARDAL

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Amend
06/30/2010 02:45 PM)

Darla S. Williamson

6/3/2010

AMEN

CCWRIGRM

Amended Notice of Taking the Deposition of
Glenn Mosell

Darla S. Williamson

6/7/2010

MEMO

CCWRIGRM

Defendants Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiffs Motions to Compel

Darla S. Williamson

6/9/2010

DCHH

DCKORSJP

Darla S. Williamson
Hearing result for Motion to Compel held on
06/09/2010 02:45 PM: District Court Hearing Heh
Court Reporter: Jayleen Tillman
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Less than 100 Pages

6/23/2010

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Affidavit of Daniel E Williams

Darla S. Williamson

MEMO

CCWRIGRM

Defendants Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiffs Motion to File Second Amended
Complaint

Darla S. Williamson

6/25/2010

REPL

CCSULLJA

Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum Filed in Support of Darla S. Williamson
Its Motion to Amend Complaint

6/30/2010

DCHH

DCKORSJP

Hearing result for Motion to Amend held on
Darla S. Williamson
06/30/2010 02:45 PM: District Court Hearing Hel<
Court Reporter: No Court Reporter
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Less than 100 Pages

7/2/2010

NOTS

CCAMESLC

Notice Of Service

Darla S. Williamson

DEWI

CCAMESLC

Defendant's Witness List

Darla S. Williamson

NOTS

CCTOWNRD

Notice Of Service

Darla S. Williamson

MISC

CCWRIGRM

Mosell Equities Disclosure of Lay Witnesses for
Trial

Darla S. Williamson

NOTC

DCKORSJP

Notice of PreTrial Conference

Darla S. Williamson

HRSC

DCKORSJP

Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference
07/21/2010 02:45 PM)

Darla S. Williamson

DCHH

DCKORSJP

Darla S. Williamson
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on
07/21/2010 02:45 PM: District Court Hearing Heh
Court Reporter: Penny Tardiff
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Less than 100 Pages

HRSC

DCKORSJP

Hearing Scheduled (Motion in Limine
07/30/2010 09:00 AM)

Darla S. Williamson

7/23/2010

NOTS

MCBIEHKJ

Notice Of Service

Darla S. Williamson

7/26/2010

HRVC

DCKORSJP

Hearing result for Motion in Limine held on
07/30/2010 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated

Darla S. Williamson

7/29/2010

STIP

CCKINGAJ

Stipulation to Vacate and Reset Trial Date and
Hearing Date

Darla S. Williamson

8/2/2010

HRVC

DCKORSJP

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 08/02/2010
08:30 AM: Hearing Vacated

Darla S. Williamson

7/12/2010

7/21/2010

Judge

000010
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Date
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8/2/2010

HRSC

DCKORSJP

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 09/07/2010 08:30 Darla S. Williamson
AM)

8/4/2010

ORDR

DCKORSJP

Order to Vacate and Reset Trial Date and
Hearing Date

Darla S. Williamson

8/25/2010

MISC

DCKORSJP

PreTrial Order

Darla S. Williamson

8/27/2010

MOTN

CCSWEECE

Defendants Motion In Limine

Darla S. Williamson

MOTN

CCSWEECE

Plaintiffs Motion In Limine To Exclude Irrelevant
Evidence: Other Litigation

Darla S. Williamson

MOTN

CCSWEECE

Plaintiffs Motion In Limine To Exclude Irrelevant Darla S. Williamson
Evidence: Assignment Of Potential Proceeds As
Collateral For Loan

8/30/2010

MEMO

CCSWEECE

Defendants Memorandum In Opposition To
Motion In Limine RE: Other Litigation

Darla S. Williamson

8/31/2010

JRYI

CCGARDAL

Proposed Jury Instructions and Verdict Form

Darla S. Williamson

HRSC

CCNELSRF

Hearing Scheduled (Motion in Limine
08/31/2010 01:30 PM)

Dennis E. Goff

DCHH

CCNELSRF

Dennis E. Goff
Hearing result for Motion in Limine held on
08/31/2010 01 :30 PM: District Court Hearing Hel1
Court Reporter: no court reporter
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated:

MISC

MCBIEHKJ

Defendants Special Verdict

Darla S. Williamson

MISC

MCBIEHKJ

Requested Jury Instructions

Darla S. Williamson

BREF

CCRANDJD

Defendants Trial Brief

Darla S. Williamson

MISC

CCMASTLW

Defendants' Supplemental Witness Disclosures

Darla S. Williamson

MISC

CCNELSRF

Mosell Equities' Disclosure Of Trial Exhibits

Darla S. Williamson

DCHH

CCNELSRF

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 09/07/2010
08:30AM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Diane Cromwell
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 500 Day 1

Darla S. Williamson

HRSC

CCNELSRF

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 09/08/2010 09:00 Darla S. Williamson
AM) Day 2

HRSC

CCNELSRF

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 09/09/2010 09:00 Darla S. Williamson
AM) Day 3

EXLT

CCNELSRF

Defendant's Exhibit List

Darla S. Williamson

BREF

CCNELSRF

Trial Bench Brief: Admissibility of Extrinsic
Evidence of Defendant's Prior Inconsistent
Statement

Darla S. Williamson

DCHH

CCNELSRF

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 09/08/2010
09:00AM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter:, NONE
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: ,NONE Day 2

Darla S. Williamson

HRSC

CCNELSRF

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 09/14/2010 09:00 Darla S. Williamson
AM) Day4
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Case: CV-OC-2009-09974 Current Judge: Darla S. Williamson
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Date

Code
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9/9/2010

DCHH

CCNELSRF

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 09/09/2010
09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: ,None
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: None .... Day 3

Darla S. Williamson

9/13/2010

AFOS

MCBIEHKJ

(5)Affidavit Of Service of Subpoena

Darla S. Williamson

9/14/2010

HRSC

CCNELSRF

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 09/15/2010 09:00 Darla S. Williamson
AM) Day 5

HRSC

CCNELSRF

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 09/16/2010 09:00 Darla S. Williamson
AM) Day 6

DCHH

CCNELSRF

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 09/14/2010
09:00AM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: , NONE
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: , NONE Day 4

Darla S. Williamson

DCHH

CCNELSRF

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 09/15/2010
09:00AM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: None
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: None Day 5

Darla S. Williamson

HRVC

CCNELSRF

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 09/16/2010
09:00AM: Hearing Vacated Day 6

Darla S. Williamson

PLJI

DCTYLENI

Plaintiffs Requested Jury Instructions-Court
Modified and Filed

Dennis E. Goff

OF.II

DCTYLENI

Defendants Requested Jury Instructions-Court
Modified and Filed

Dennis E. Goff

JRYI

CCNELSRF

Jury Instructions

Darla S. Williamson

VERD

CCNELSRF

Verdict Form

Darla S. Williamson

9/17/2010

MOTN

MCBIEHKJ

Motion in Limine to Exclude Irrelevant Evidence

Darla S. Williamson

9/21/2010

MEMO

CCAMESLC

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for
Judgment Not Withstanding the Verdict or in the
Alternative Motion for a New trial

Darla S. Williamson

NOTH

CCJOYCCN

Notice Of Hearing (10/6/2010 at 9:00 a.m.)

Darla S. Williamson

HRSC

CCJOYCCN

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/06/2010 09:00
AM) Motion for JNOV, and in the Alternative,
Motion for New Trial

Darla S. Williamson

9/29/2010

MEMO

CCSIMMSM

Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding
the Verdict, or in the Alternative, Motion for new
Trial

Darla S. Williamson

10/1/2010

MEMO

CCSULLJA

Darla S. Williamson
Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict,
or in the Alternative, Motion for New Trial

10/4/2010

CONT

DCTYLENI

Continued (Motion 10/07/2010 03:00 PM)
Motion for .INOV, and in the Alternative, Motion
for New Trial

Dennis E. Goff

AMEN

DCTYLENI

Amended l\lotice of Hearing (10/7/10@ 3:00
p.m.)

Dennis E. Goff

9/15/2010

Judge
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10/7/2010

DCHH

TCJOHNKA

Hearing result for Motion held on 10/07/2010
03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: No reporter
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 100 pages

Dennis E. Goff

10/26/2010

ORDR

DCTYLENI

Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict on Count 1 of Its
Complaint

Dennis E. Goff

10/29/2010

HRSC

DCKORSJP

Hearing Scheduled (Status 11/10/2010 02:45
PM)

Darla S. Williamson

DCKORSJP

Notice of Hearing

Darla S. Williamson

Judge

MOTN

CCRANDJD

Motion to Amend/Correct Order

Darla S. Williamson

MEMO

CCRANDJD

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend
Correct Order

Darla S. Williamson

OBJC

CCKINGAJ

Objection & Opposition to Defenant's Motion to
Amend/Correct Order

Darla S. Williamson

AFFD

CCKINGAJ

Affidavit of Eric R Clark Filed in Opposition to
Defendant's Motion to CorrecUAmend Order

Darla S. Williamson

11/10/2010

HRVC

DCKORSJP

Hearing result for Status held on 11/10/2010
02:45 PM: Hearing Vacated

Darla S. Williamson

11/23/2010

ORDR

DCTYLENI

Order of Clarification

Dennis E. Goff

12/2/2010

ROST

CCRANDJD

Request for Trial Setting

Darla S. Williamson

12/6/2010

APSC

CCLUNDMJ

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Darla S. Williamson

12/17/2010

NOTC

CCHOLMEE

Notice of Cross Appeal

Darla S. Williamson

1/10/2011

.IDMT

DCTYLENI

Judgment

Darla S. Williamson

INAC

DCTYLENI

Inactive (Stayed Pending Decision on SC Appeal) Darla S. Williamson

STAT

DCTYLENI

STATUS CHANGED: inactive

Dennis E. Goff

9/6/2011

NOTC

CCTHIEBJ

Notice Of Transcript Lodged - Supreme Court
Docket No. 38338

Darla S. Williamson

10/4/2011

MOTN

CCWRIGRM

Defendants Motion to Amend Transcript on
Appeal

Darla S. Williamson

NOTH

CCWRIGRM

Notice Of Hearing on Defendants Motion to
Amend Transcript Appeal

Darla S. Williamson

HRSC

CCWRIGRM

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
11/30/2011 02:45 PM)

Darla S. Williamson

STIP

DCKORSJP

Stipulated Order to Amend Transcript on _Appeal

Lynn G Norton

HRVC

DCKORSJP

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled
on 11/30/2011 02:45 PM: Hearing Vacated

Lynn G Norton

11/3/2011

MISC

CCWATSCL

Estimated Cost of Amended Appeal Transcript

Darla S. Williamson

11/21/2011

NOTC

CCWATSCL

Notice of Payment Estimated of Amended Appeal Darla S. Williamson
Transcript

12/21/2011

NOTC

CCTHIEBJ

(2) Notice Of Transcript Lodged - Supreme Court Darla S. Williamson
Docket No. 38338

3/1/2013

MISC

CCTHIEBJ

Opinion - Supreme Court Docket No. 38338

11/4/2010

11/5/2010

10/28/2011

Darla Williamson
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3/28/2013

REMT

CCTHIEBJ

Remittitur-Reversed Supreme Court Docket No.
38338

Darla Williamson

4/24/2013

STIP

MCBIEHKJ

Stipulation for Scheduling After Appeal and
Remand

District Court Clerk

5/1/2013

NOHG

CCNELSRF

Notice Of Hearing

District Court Clerk

HRSC

CCNELSRF

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/11/2013 10:00
AM) for New Trial After Remand

District Court Clerk

5/3/2013

MEMO

CCVIDASL

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for
New Trial Following Appeal Remand

District Court Clerk

6/4/2013

MEMO

CCMEYEAR

Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion
for New trial Following Appeal and Remand

District Court Clerk

AFFD

CCMEYEAR

Affidavit of Chris Pierce in Support of Defendants' District Court Clerk
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion
for New Trial Following Appeal and Remand

MOTN

CCHEATJL

Motion To Strike Defendants' Memorandum In
Opposition To Plaintiffs Motion For New Trial
Following Remand

NOHG

CCHEATJL

Notice Of Hearing RE: Motion For New Trial After District Court Clerk
Remand (July 11 2013@10am)

6/17/2013

MEMO

CCMARTJD

Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for New District Court Clerk
Trial

7/3/2013

MEMO

CCMARTJD

Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Strike

7/11/2013

DCHH

TCLYCAAM

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
District Court Clerk
07/11/2013 10:00 AM: District Court Hearing Heh
Court Reporter: None
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: for New Trial After Remand

7/18/2013

ROST

CCMARTJD

Plaintiffs Request for Trial Setting After Remand
From the Supreme Court

District Court Clerk

REQU

CCSCOTDL

Plaintiffs Request for Trial Setting After remand
from the Supreme Court

District Court Clerk

RESP

CCNELSRF

Defs Response To Plfs Plaintiffs Request for
Trial Setting After remand from the Supreme
Court

District Court Clerk

REPL

CCNELSRF

Plfs Reply to Defs Response To Plfs Plaintiffs
Request for Trial Setting After remand from the
Supreme Court

District Court Clerk

8/19/2013

DEOP

DCLYKEMA

Memorandum Decision and Order

Dennis E. Goff

8/20/2013

ORDR

DCLYKEMA

Order Granting New Trial

Dennis E. Goff

8/22/2013

MISC

CCHEAT,IL

Plaintiffs Unavailable Dates For Trial

Dennis E. Goff

APSC

CCTHIEBJ

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Dennis E. Goff

NOTA

CCTHIEBJ

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Dennis E. Goff

AMEN

CCTHIEBJ

Amended Notice of Appeal

Dennis E. Goff

6/11/2013

7/23/2013

9/5/2013

Judge

District Court Clerk

District Court Clerk
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MAY O3 2013
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By STEPHANIE VIDAK.

ERIC R. CLARK, Esq.
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616
Office: 208-830-8084
Fax: 208-939-7136
Idaho State Bar No. 4697

DEPUTY

Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE ST ATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited
Liability Company,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC. an Idaho
Corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as
husband and wife,

Case No. CV OC 0909974

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL FOLLOWING
APPEAL AND REMAND

Judge Dennis Goff

Defendants.

After reversing Judge Goffs grant of Mosell Equities' Motion for JNOV, the Supreme Court
has remanded this case to Judge Goff and has directed the Court to decide Mosen Equities• Motion for
New Trial. Fortunately, for Mosen Equities, the evidence is equally compelling to support granting a
Motion for New Trial.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
FOLLOWING APPEAL AND REMAND - I
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SUPREME COURT DECISION
The Supreme Court reversed this Court on its decision granting JNOV, and consequently, the
facts stated in the Supreme Court's opinion were consistent with a JNOV standard. "The party making
the motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict necessarily admits the truth of all of the opposing
party's evidence and every legitimate inference that could be drawn from that evidence in the light most
favorable to the opposing party. Mosell Equities v. Berryhill, Doc. No. 38338 (2013), p. 7, citing Quick v.

Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 763, 727 P.2d 1187, 1191 (1986). However, on Remand, this Court is not constrained
to apply that standard.
In its opinion, the Supreme Court identified the standard Judge Goff is to apply when

considering Mosen Equities' Motion for New Trail.
"A trial judge may grant a new trial on that ground [insufficiency of the evidence] if,
after making his or her own assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and weighing
the evidence, the judge determines that the verdict is not in accord with the clear weight
of the evidence."

Mosell Equities v. Berryhill, Doc. No. 38338 (2013), p. 13, quoting Hudelson v. Delta Intern. Mach.
Corp., 142 Idaho 244,248, 127 P.3d 147, 151 (2005).
Unlike the Supreme Court, which literally considered every word Berryhill stated as a true fact,
regardless of his contradictory statements or the conflicting evidence, this Court is entitled to render its
opinion based on the Court's own assessment of the credibility of witnesses and after weighing the
evidence. Furthermore, on review if another appeal ensues, this Court's opinion is subject to review as
an abuse of discretion. "Decisions within the discretion of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal
absent a showing of clear and manifest abuse of discretion." Crowley v. Critchfield, 145 Idaho 509, 512,
181 P.3d 435,438, (2007).
As Mosell Equities argued to the Supreme Court and now again on remand, Judge Goff was
correct in concluding, first, that John Berryhill was not credible, and second, that the clear weight of the
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
FOLLOWING APPEAL AND REMAND - 2
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evidence 1 established the parties agreed Mosen Equities would loan money to Berryhill & Company,
which at some future time may be applied to fund Mosen Equities' "buy-in" if the parties could agree to
terms. In its briefing, Mosell Equities cited extensively to the actual trial testimony and exhibits, so the
Supreme Court fully evaluated the evidence presented at trial. If the Supreme Court, on remand, did not
believe this record would support a decision by Judge Goff that the clear weight of the evidence
established there was a contract that Berryhill breached, then why would the Supreme Court remand the
case for Judge Goff s consideration and opinion? Mosell Equities believes this Court was therefore
right the first time, and Mosen Equities is entitled to a new trial. The Supreme Court simply was
concerned with upholding the JNOV based on the applicable standard.

I. JUDGE GOFF WAS CORRECT-JOHN BERRYIDLL WAS NOT CREDIBLE
Several times during the trial, Judge Goff had to admonish Berryhill and direct him to answer the
questions asked. "The attorney asks the question, you cannot reword the question. You have to answer
the question and not volunteer answers; okay? I put up with it yesterday for several hours, I'm not
putting up with it today." Tr. Vol. 1, p. 529, L. 13-16. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 578, L. 4-24. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 727, L.
15 top. 728, L. 4. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 731, L. 18-23.
Ultimately, in his oral ruling, Judge Goff, although being diplomatic, found that Berryhill was
not credible.
[JNOV Tr., p. 91]

17
10
19
20
21
22
23
24

... And the Law talks about the
probative values and - - rather, the requisite standard is
whether the evidence is sufficient of quality and
probative value that reasonable minds could reach the
same conclusion as did the jury/
So, when I analyze this, and based really
upon Counsels' arguments today, it seemed to me, in
trial and during the arguments today, that Berryhill

1

On Appeal Mosen Equities argued this Court had granted Mosen Equities' Motion For New Trial, but the Supreme Court
focused on the Court's Supplemental Order where Judge Goff stated the Motion For New Trial issue was "moot."
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
FOLLOWING APPEAL AND REMAND - 3

000017

25 wants to only take one side or one edge of the sword. If

P.92
1
2
3
4
5

you call something a loan in your handwriting, and
you put in our own - and instruct your own staff to
insert it, whether you're a taxpayer, or for tax
purposes, or for whatever, as a loan, than how can you
not take the other side of the - - the deal that it is a
6 loan. And that has bothered me from day one.

The great weight of the evidence established the plain language Berryhill used in Exhibit 1
confirmed the parties intended the funds to be loans and, that if they later agreed to buy-in terms, at that

time the funds would transition to equity. Mosell clearly expressed his understanding of the agreement
when he wrote "loan" conspicuously on the checks 2 he provided to Berryhill. And, Berryhill confirmed
his understanding the funds were and remained as loaned funds by accounting for these funds as loans
on his company's books, pending the completion of the "buy-in" documents by Berryhill's attorneys,
and by acknowledging the parties intent the funds were loans in purchase documents Berryhill's attorney
drafted. Berryhill's testimony that he understood the money was something other than a loan, pending
the "buy-in" was simply not credible.

II. THE VERDICT FINDING NO EXPRESS CONTRACT WAS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE
CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE

In addition to identifying Berryhill's lack of credibility, Judge Goff was correct that the clear
weight of the evidence established the parties intended the funds to remain a loan pending the
finalization of the buy-in terms. "The conduct of the parties to a contract and their practical
interpretation of it is an important factor when there is a dispute over its meaning." Mountainview

Landowners Co-Op. v. Cool, 142 Idaho 861, 865, 136 P.3d 332,336, (2006).

2 The

Supreme Court erroneously concluded two of the checks were not marked loan. However, the October 9, 2007 check,
the Supreme Court claimed said, "Kitchen equipment" really said, "Kitchen Equip Loan." A copy of all of the checks as
marked for admission at trial is attached.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
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A. Loan Meant "Loan" And The Great Weigh Of The Evidence Confirms Berryhill's Understanding
The Funds Received From Mosell Equities Were Loans.
The phrase "This is a loan ... " or the term "loan" written on Mosell Equities' checks was not
ambiguous.
The determination of whether a contract is ambiguous on its face must be decided by
giving the words or phrases used their ordinary meanings. Shawver v. Huckleberry
Estates, L.L.C., 140 Idaho, 354, 93 P.3d 685 (2004). A party's subjective, undisclosed
interpretation of a word or phrase cannot make the contract ambiguous. If it could, then
all contracts would be rendered ambiguous merely by a party asserting a
misunderstanding of the meaning of one or more of the words used."
"The intent of the parties is determined from the plain meaning of the words." Clear
Lakes Trout Co., Inc. v. Clear Springs Foods, Inc., 141 Idaho 117, 120, 106 P.3d 443,
446 (2005). A contract is not rendered ambiguous on its face because one of the
parties thought that the words used had some meaning that differed from the
ordinary meaning of those words. As explained in 17A Am.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 348
(2004):

If the language used by the parties is plain, complete, and unambiguous, the intention of
the parties must be gathered from that, language, arid from that language alone, no matter
what the actual or secret intentions of the parties may have been. Presumptively, the
intent of the parties to a contract is expressed by the natural and ordinary meaning of their
language referable to it, and such meaning cannot be perverted or destroyed by the courts
through construction, for the parties are presumed to have intended what the terms clearly
state. Only when the language of the contract is ambiguous may a court tum to extrinsic
evidence of the contracting parties' intent.

Swanson v. Beco Const. Co., Inc., 145 Idaho 59, 63, 175 P.3d 748, 752, (2007) (Emphasis Added).)
In its Decision, the Supreme Court found that based on Berryhill's own self-serving testimony,
(applying the JNOV review standard) the Jury could have found that "loan" really meant something
related to "tax purposes."
Based upon the testimony of Mr. Berryhill, the jury could have found that the word "loan" in
Exhibit 1 and on the checks had a special meaning other than what would be its ordinary
meaning. That special meaning was that it was just a label for tax purposes. The payments
were to create the downtown restaurant and other facilities in order to help convince others to
invest in Polo Cove, and therefore the payments related to moving the restaurant downtown
and constructing the tenant improvements in both the originally leased space and in the
expansion were simply sums spent to market the Polo Cove development.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
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Masell Equities v. Berryhill, Doc. No. 38338 (2013), p. 8.

However, as discussed at length below, Berryhill provided no evidence to support his "it really
meant tax purposes" version. Moreover, there was no evidence to support Berryhill's claim Mosell
Equities gave Berryhill $405,000.00 which Berryhill got to keep if Polo Cove did not materialize, which
appears to be what the Supreme Court is stating. The reality is no reasonable businessman would have
"done that deal," and the Supreme Court fails to cite to any evidence, other than Berryhill's testimony,
to support its conclusions.

B. The Evidence Was Undisputed That Berryhill Treated Mosell Equities' Money As A Loan.
On June 28, 2007 Glenn Mosell wrote Check No. 5127 to "Berryhill & Co." for $50,000.00 and
wrote "loan" conspicuously on the "memo" line of that check. (Exhibits 1 and 2.)
Berryhill then took that check and made a copy. Below the copy of the check, Berryhill wrote,
"This is a loan .... " He concluded with the statement, "It will be transitioned into part of Glenn's 'buy
in' of MoBerry Ventures Corp. Inc." Both Berryhill and Mosell signed the agreement. (Exhibit 1.)
-- ·-· -- - -

-- -

MOSEtL EQLITIES LLC
/-It) 15('11. l ~

!: It,,{_,~ t l~

ti;e,: ...
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Mosell testified the he hand delivered each check, (Exhibits 1-11 ), to Berryhill and Berryhill
accepted each check. Tr. Vol. I, p. 230, L. 1 top. 339, L. 2.
Joy Luedtke was the the General Manager and bookkeeper for Berryhill & Co. from October
2007 through October 2008. Luedtke said she became the General Manager in October 2007, after
Mosell Equities had already provided over $200,000.00 to Berryhill & Co. Luedtke recalled what when
she received a check in October 2007 she created a bookkeeping "equity" account for Mosell Equities
because she thought Mosell and Berryhill "were already partners." She testified that Mosell approached
her and asked her to correct the error and to place the money in the long-term liability account that
Berryhill has already created regarding the Mosell Equities' loans. Luedtke confirmed that she made the
correction after she "cleared it with John [Berryhill]." Tr. Vol. I, p. 268, L. 9, top. 270, L. 7.
Luedtke testified that she as the Berryhill & Co. bookkeeper always accounted for the money
received from Mosell Equities as a loan to Berryhill & Co and did so after verifying that doing so was
appropriate with Berryhill and with Amy Dempsey, CPA, Berryhill & Co's accountant. Tr. Vol. I, p.
268, L. 9 to p. 270, L. 7.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
FOLLOWING APPEAL AND REMAND - 7

000021

Luedtke also testified that Exhibit 53 was in error. Tr. Vol. I, p. 271, L. 2 top. 272, L. 7. As of
June 2008, Berryhill & Co. was correctly reporting Mosell Equities' contributions of $385,000.00 as
long-term liabilities (debt), but the figure should have been the full $405,000.00 paid as of June 2008.
Long Tenn U.billtlell

fei!~::!~c~al Loan-oee

C

I
Crty of Boise SEWER. Bro.idwily
Ctty of Boise SEWER • Downtown
Total Long Term Liabilities

Total L1abiht1es

~:~::~ :=>
5.208 11
9 039 12
505.041 74
736.~46 22

-50,000.00

(Excerpt from Exhibit 53.)
Luedtke stated that had the buy-in occurred, she would have made an accounting entry closing
out the Mosell Equities' long-term liability [loan] account and creating an "equity" account reflecting
Mosell Equities' ownership interest, but that she never was asked to make any such changes. Tr. Vol. I,
p. 275, L. 4-9.

When Mosell approached Berryhill in September 2008 regarding Mosell Equities' money,
Luedtke explained that she had conversations with Berryhill about Mosell's request and that she and
Berryhill reviewed and considered possible sources of repayment of Mosell Equities' loaned funds. Tr.
Vol. I, p. 284, L. 8-24.
Luedtke also stated that Berryhill never told her, at any time while she was the Berryhill & Co.
general manager, that Berryhill disputed Berryhill & Co. owed the money to Mosell Equities or that
Berryhill asserted Mosell Equities' money was not a loan. Tr. Vol. I, p. 285, L. 3-5.
Amy Dempsey, Berryhill & Co.'s CPA, responded to Berryhill's inquiry regarding the Mosell
Equities' money in an e-mail dated March 5, 2008 and referred to Mosell Equities' money "on the
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books" as a loan. (Exhibit 37.) This e-mail contradicted her testimony at trial that Dempsey really did
not know what the funds were.
>--··· Ori~innl Mcssa~c ---->From: Amy Dcmp:.cy <amvra!taxguv:-.cc-----..
>To: John Berryhill
>Cc: Glenn Moscll <moscl({(i.:mac.com>: Glenn Moscll <moscll-0:·all.nel>
>Sent: Wed Mar 05 06:06:24 2008
>Subject: RE: Mee1ing next week?
>

>Hi John?

>No problem! As far as a IO am meeting I have Thursday the 6th available or Friday the
14th. If your mnin concern is setting up the partnership in 2007 vs. 20081 do not think it
\.,.·ill make much difference. If you chose to continue to set it up in 2007 then Glenn
would receive a K.·1 from Hcrryh11l, 1tyou chose to set the buy-in in 2008 then we would
just leave the monies Gleim donated in 2007 on the books a.'i a loan and then reclass the
loon amounts that are associated \\ith the buy-in to his capital account in 2008.

Other than Berryhill's self-serving testimony, there was no evidence to support Berryhill's
contention "loan" was just a label for tax purposes as the Supreme Court claimed the Jury could have
believed. Moreover, not a single document or witnesses corroborated Berryhill's claim he or anyone for
that matter meant the term "loan" was only used for "tax purposes." In fact, every witness, even
Berryhill' s own restaurant managers, accountant and attorneys, contradicted this claim.
Mosell testified he asked Berryhill to write the note in Exhibit 1 as "security for my "50,000.00
check," that Mosell believed the funds remained a loan because that was the agreement and Berryhill
accounted for Mosell Equities' funds as debt on the Berryhill & Co. books. Tr. Vol. I, p. 315, L. 3, top.
318, L. 11. Mosell denied any agreement to use the term "loan" for some tax purposes, and Berryhill
failed to provide any testimony, lay or expert, to support his contention that writing "loan" on the checks
and on Exhibit 1 would have some tax benefit to either Mosell Equities or Berryhill.
Thereafter, over the next ten months, Glenn Mosell personally delivered nine other checks,
which Mosell Equities asserted at trial constituted the funds for Mosell Equities' buy-in of half of
Berryhill & Co. Mosell testified that he understood the the money would remain as a loan pending the
transition to an ownership interest.
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P. 317 [Mosen Testifying]
10 Q. Did the - did the buy-in ever occur
11 mister - Mr. Mosell?
12 A. It did not.
13 Q. Okay. Was it part of the deal that 14 well, you said it was a loan, and then what was your
15 understanding of the trans - the transition?
16 A. I would make loans to the company, the loans
17 would be recorded on the company books. And they would
18 either be repaid to me, as a loan would be, or that loan
19 would be converted to equity or stock in Berryhill &
20 Company, and that was the understanding.
Mosell testified he wrote "loan" on the checks because at the time he and Berryhill were
contemplating the buy-in an attorney, Kim Gourley, was working on the documents that provided
Mosell Equities would pay $387,000.00 for 50% of Berryhill & Co., and because Berryhill had found
the downtown restaurant space, Berryhill asked Mosell to "front the money." Tr. Vol. I, p. 230, L. 10 to
p. 235, L. 17 and p. 237, L. 3 to p. 239, L. 2.
Mosell also testified that the first time he heard that Berryhill was disputing the funds were a
loan was in response to a demand for repayment sent to Mosell Equities' attorney in April 2009. Tr.
Vol. I, p. 318, L. 19 top. 320, L. 8.

C. The Meier Documents Confirmed Berryhill's Understanding The Funds Were A Loan
Attorney Meier drafted certain corporate documents after meeting with Mosell and Berryhill in
January 2008. (Exhibit 35.) Mosell testified that Meier advised a simpler approach was to eliminate
"MoBerry, Inc." Tr. Vol. I, p. 249, L. 14 top. 251, L. 6. Based on Mosell and Berryhill's discussions
with Meier, she drafted several corporate documents that identified her understanding of what had
transpired between Mosell and Berryhill as of their meeting in January 2008.
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Special Meeting of the Board of Directors and Shareholders
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC.
SPF.CIAL MEETING OF THE

BOARD 01;· DIRECTORS AND SHAREIIOLDER.S
Effective the December 31. 2007
The undc.rsigned, being Secretal)' of BERRYHTTJ. & COMPANY, l1'C .• an Idaho
corporatiOfl (the ''Company'"). by this instrument evidences 1he actions and resolutions undertaken
at the special meeting of the Board of Directors and Shareholders of the Company. Pre~nt was
the sole Shareholder and the Directors who waived notice of the meeting

WHEREAS, the Comp~ny has borrowed Fol!r Hunued Thousand Dollars from Glenn E.
Mose II for the funding of lhc relocation of the Company· s re.;taurant to a ne-w location and for the
capittl improvements to te made to the restaurant and banquet rooms.
WHEREAS, Glenn E. Mos.ell desires to acquire an interest in the Company in e,cchan~
for. and as repaym~nt of, the amount lent to the Company.

Stock Purchase Document
STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT
THIS STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT (hereinafter "Agreement") is made and entered into
effective the _ _day o f - - - - - ~ · 2007, by and between BERRYHILL & COMPANY,
INC., an Idaho corporation (the "Corporation"), and GLENN E. MOSELL, a married man dealing with
his separate property ("Mosell").

\\' I TN E S SETH:
WHEREAS, John Berryhill (the "Shareholder") is the sole shareholder and record owner of two

hundred (200) shares, $1 .00 par val u.e. of the issued and outstanding common capilaf stock of BERRYHll.L
& ffiMPANY, INC., an Idaho corporation (hereinafter tbe "C.orporation"). John Berryhill's shares represent
one hundred percent ( I00%) of the issued and outstanding common capital stock of the Corporation and are
evidenced by Certificates No. I and No. 2.
WHEREAS, during the calendar year of 2007. Mosel! loaned the Comoration Four Hundred
Thousand Dollars ($400 1000) to fund the relocation of the Corporation's restaurant and for capital

improvements needed for the Corporation's restaurant and banquet r o o m ~

WHEREAS. the Corporation desires to issue two hundred <2001 shares of the Corporation's
common capital stock. to Mosell as repayment of the Loan. Mosell desires to accept the two hundred
(200) shares of the Corporation's common capital stock
repayment of the Loan and to h.nve the Loan
r~classified on die Corporation's books and records as a capilal comribulion frum Mosell.

as

WHEREAS. after tl1e execution of this Agreement, Masell and the Shan~J1older will e.ach own
fifty percent (.50%) of lhe common capital stock of the Corporation.
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Satisfaction of Loan Doument

SATISFACTION OF LOAN
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that GLENN E. MOSELL, a married man
dealing with his sole and separate property, does hereby certify and declare that the certain Loan
in the original amount of Four Hundred Thousand Dollars ($400,000) mode and entered into by

BERRYHILL & COMPANY, an Idaho corporation, as ··borrower.. , to GLENN E. MOSELL,
as .. ,ender", is fully paid, satisfied and discharged.

DATED: _ _ _ _ _, 200_.
Glem1 E. Mosell

The "buy-in" terms identified and confirmed in the Meier documents were consistent with
Berryhill's testimony in the Broadway Park case that Mosell Equities had already paid in the required
funds and all that was left was to sign the appropriate documents. Tr. Vol. I, p. 445, L. 4 top. 448, L.
13.
[Pg. 447.] [Reading Berryhill's testimony in the Broadway Park case.]
MR. CLARK: Thank you, "your Honor."
16 Q. BY MR. CLARK: So, let- let ne move down.
11 So, what would - what are the approximate
18 total amounts of these payments?
19 Ques - or answer: A little under
20 half-million dollars.
21 For these - for ease of discussion,
22 I'm going to call it 500,000, but I'm not 23 I'm noting that you said it's slightly under.
24 Answer - your answer: Okay.
25 What did Mosell Equities get in exchange
[Pg. 447.]
1 for this half million dollars?
2 Berryhill's answer: 50 percent of
3 Berryhill & Company.
4 So, to - and question: So, today
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5 Mosen Equities owns 50 percent of
6 Berryhill & Company?
7 Answer, there's - actually, no. The
8 paperwork is being drawn up.
9 Question: But that's your understanding?
10 Answer: Yes.
H So, he's - or Mosen Equities is going
12 to be a 50 percent shareholder?
13 Yes.

Mosen testified that he had agreed to increase the buy-in figure to $400,000.00, which Meier
indicated in her documents. Tr. Vol. I, p. 251, L 7 to p. 256, L. 16.
After the Meier meeting in January 2008, the owners in the Broadway Park case deposed
Mosen, who testified in that case the funds were a loan that were to be converted, but if the conversion
did not occur, Mosen was to receive his money back. Mosen also confirmed Berryhill was present at
Mosen's deposition, which occurred a week after Berryhill's Broadway Park deposition, and that
Berryhill never questioned Mosen's testimony.
[Mosell testifying]
1. Q. Did you testify regarding your understanding
2 of whether or not the funds were a loan or not?
3 A. Yes. I stated that there was a loan to
4 Berryhill & Company to be converted to 50 percent cash,
5 but if we did not consummate that, then I would receive
6 my cash back.
7 Q. And was Mr. Berryhill in the room with
8 you-9 A. Yes.
10 Q. - at that time?
11 And after your deposition, did Mr. Berryhill
12 indicate to you, in any manner, that he didn't believe
13 your testimony was correct?
14 A. He did not.
Tr. Vol. I, p. 259, L. 1-14.
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Berryhill also claimed he refused to sign the Meier documents because the documents were not
correct. However, Berryhill could not identify what he believed was missing from or needed to be
added to the Meier documents to represent what Berryhill believed were the terms of the agreement. Tr.
Vol. I, p. 452, 1. 18 top. 456, L. 14. Although he had numerous opportunities at trial, Berryhill never
claimed that the "loan" language in the Meier documents, which were drafted by his own attorney, was
incorrect, or that it really meant for "tax purposes."

D. The Polo Cove Project Was A Distant Dream
Berryhill claimed that the move downtown and everything else he did was all related to "Polo
Cove." However, when asked about the terms of any alleged agreement between Mosell or Mosell
Equities and John Berryhill or Berryhill & Co, Berryhill conceded there were no terms to the alleged
contract.
P470 [Berryhill testifying]
15. Q. What was your agreement? That's what I'm
16 trying to get to you.
17 A. Polo Cove.
18 Q. Well, okay. You both had an agreement about
19 Polo Cove. What were the terms of the agreement about
20 Polo Cove?
21 A. There was nothing written down.
22 Q. Okay. So, you had an agreement about
23 Polo Cove with no terms?
24 A. That's correct.
Berryhill also admitted that Mosell never promised or guaranteed the success of Polo Cove,
which was but one of the opportunities Berryhill documented in his vision. (Exhibit 18.)
P475 [Berryhill testifying]
15 Q. Okay. You're not - you're not contending
16 and - and you're fair, in your deposition you answered
17 this correctly - or succinctly. And I asked you
18 point blank, do you believe Mr. Mosell or Mos 19 Mosell Equities guaranteed to you the success of
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20 Polo Cove or anything that was associated with
21 Polo Cove?
22 A. No.
Between 2005 and February 2007 Mosen Equities paid Berryhill $25,000.00 for his consulting
work on the Polo Cove project. (Exhibits 12-15.)
The Berryhill Restaurant [Downtown] had its grand opening in August 2007, and Berryhill
testified in the Broadway Park litigation in January 2008, that he had "pushed back" from the Polo Cove
Project and had not worked on Polo Cove for the last six months. Tr. Vol. I, p. 534, L. 2 top. 535, L.
24.
Notwithstanding Berryhill's admission that Mosell never promised or guaranteed the success of
Polo Cove, or the fact that Mosell Equities paid Berryhill $25,000.00 for consulting, or the fact that
Berryhill admitted he had not been working on the Polo Cove project for the last half of 2007, Berryhill
presented evidence at trial that his "name" and "reputation" somehow added value to the failed Polo
Cove project. However, Berryhill ultimately conceded that even his "name" could not save or
resuscitate the project. Tr. Vol. I, p. 733, L. 10 top. 734 , L. 11.
Robert Taunton, who has a master's degree in land planning, and who has 30 years experience in
land development, testified that he was involved in the Polo Cove project as a consultant. Tr. Vol. I, p.
195, L. 11 top. 196, L 3. Mr. Taunton testified that he believed Polo Cove was a "viable project," and
he could not blame anyone for the lack of the project's success. Tr. Vol. I, p. 201, L. 25 top. 203, L. 19.
Mr. Taunton, also testified that he did not get the impression or have any belief that the only reason the
Berryhill & Co. restaurant was moved downtown was to further the Polo Cove project as Berryhill
contended. Tr. Vol. I, p. 205, L. 18-22.
The reality, Polo Cove was a great idea. However, like many other development ventures at the
time, it was a victim of the economic collapse in 2008. While there were some high-quality
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prospectuses, (Exhibits 44 and 45), Mr. Taunton confirmed the project never broke ground. Tr. Vol. I, p.
202, L. 20 top. 203, L. 19.
On January 30, 2008, during his deposition in the Broadway Park case, Berryhill answered
questions regarding the Mosell-Berryhill relationship and potential sources for payment for purchasing
the Broadway Park center. Specifically, Berryhill testified that he recognized Polo Cove was an
"amoeba" and "ever changing." Tr. Vol. I, p. 458, L. 1-14. Berryhill also testified that as of January
2008, Berryhill had "pushed away" for the last six months and was not directly involved in the Polo
Cove project. Tr. Vol. I, p. 534, L. 2 top. 535, L. 24.
Judge Goff, when deciding the post-trial motions and after hearing the testimony and analyzing
all of the evidences, stated, "Well, Polo Cove is really nothing. It was a dream in the first place .... "
JNOV Tr. p. 18, L. 7-8.
In its opinion, the Supreme Court, without citing to the record, stated:
Based upon the testimony of Mr. Berryhill, the jury could have found that the word "loan"
in Exhibit 1 and on the checks had a special meaning other than what would be its ordinary
meaning. That special meaning was that it was just a label for tax purposes. The payments
were to create the downtown restaurant and other facilities in order to help convince others to
invest in Polo Cove, and therefore the payments related to moving the restaurant downtown
and constructing the tenant improvements in both the originally leased space and in the
expansion were simply sums spent to market the Polo Cove development.

Mosell Equities v. Berryhill, Doc. No. 38338 (2013), p. 8.

During oral argument, Mosell Equities Counsel asked Justice Eismann what reasonable person
would simply give someone $405,000.00 to build a restaurant and expect compensation only if a
speculative venture that had not even broke ground came to fruition in the distant future? Judge Eismann
did not respond. Obviously, there was no reasonable response, other than a concession that no sensible
person would have done such a thing. Even Berryhill admitted he did not believe Mosell Equities was
simply giving him the $405,000.00.
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P. 482 [by Mr. Clark- Berryhill Testifying]
4 Q. Did you tell Mr. Berry - or Mr. Mosell that

5
6
7
8

if there's no transition to the buy-in, that you got to
keep the money that he had given you?
A. No.
Q. And- but he asked for it back?
9 A. No, he didn't.
10 Q. He didn't ask for the money back?
11 A. No. Not until the lawsuit.
12 Q. There wasn't a letter from Mr. Berryhill 13 Mr. Mosell's Counsel in Jan -January or February
14 of '09?
15 A. Initial -- that was the start of the
16 lawsuit. That's what I'm referring to.
17 Q. Was - was that the - what you consider the
18 lawsuit?
19 A. That was the start of it, yes.
20 Q. And - and you, in response, denied that the
21 funds were ever a loan, and denied any liability, and
22 refused to pay Mr. Mosell back.
23 A. That's correct. They were never a loan.
24 Q. Okay. Let me ask you then, what those were
25 funds, in your mind?

P. 483 [by Mr. Clark]
1 He was buying into my business.
While the Supreme Court concluded based on application of the standard for JNOV, that the
moving party concedes all adverse evidence, a standard which is not applicable to this motion, Berryhill
statement "loan" really meant "tax purposes," the Court failed to consider that not a shred of evidence
supported Berryhill's claim. Additionally, Berryhill testified Exhibits 19-21 were Berryhill's
"negotiations" with Glenn Mosell regarding the terms of their relationship. Nothing in these documents
however indicates that the "buy-in" was in any manner contingent upon the success of Polo Cove or any
of the other potential opportunities that Berryhill and Mosell were considering as listed in Exhibit 18.
Again, there was absolutely no evidence to support the Supreme Court's conclusion Glenn Mosell
intended to just give Berryhill $405,000.00 to "market" Polo Cove.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
FOLLOWING APPEAL AND REMAND - 17

000031

ID. THE VERDICT FINDING BERRYHILL HAD NOT BREACHED AN EXPRESS CONTRACT
WAS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE

The Court must also address whether there was a breach based on the jury verdict form, an easy issue
as Berryhill admits in his Appeal Brief that if there was a loan transaction, which the great weight of the
evidence established, then Berryhill breached.
"The jury quite simply found that, in determining the parties' intent, there was no simple
loan transaction intended, which was clearly within their providence to do. If they had
found a loan was intended, they would doubtless have found a breach in answer to
Question No. 1 on the Special Verdict. (R., Vol. I, p. 1026, LL 20-23) and damages in
some amount in answer to Question No. 2. Appellant's Brief, p. 30. (Emphasis added)
Obviously, if a party to a loan denies the loan exists, as did Berryhill, and refuses to repay the
funds, there is a breach, as Berryhill concedes in his Appeal Brief.
Additionally, while Berryhill testified in the Broadway Park case Mosell Equities was "buying
into my business," Berryhill received $405,000 from Mosell Equities' and Mosell Equities received
nothing. Once again, if Mosell Equities was "buying into my business," and that buy-in was not
completed, what legal basis does Berryhill have to keep the money? During cross examination, Mosell
testified there was no "transition" because when he approached Berryhill about converting the funds to
stock in Berryhill & Co., "John Berryhill denied the conversion. So they [the loaned funds] remained a
loan." Tr. Vol. I, p. 323, L. 19-24.
Berryhill conceded at trial that he understood Mosell Equities did not intend to just give the
money to Berryhill if the transition did not occur. Tr. Vol. I, p. 482, L. 4-25 top. 483, L. 1. However,
that it what the Jury would have had to have concluded to support the Supreme Court's statement,
"therefore the payments related to moving the restaurant downtown and constructing the tenant
improvements in both the originally leased space and in the expansion were simply sums spent to market the
Polo Cove development."
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The record reflects that the parties had agreed to a "buy-in" figure of $400,000.00, and that Mosell
Equities provided $405,000.00 in funds. Thereafter and although Mosell Equities substantially, if not fully,
complied with the terms of the "buy-in," Berryhill refused to tender stock or any equity in Berryhill & Co.,
Inc., and then refused to return Mosell Equities' money. Berryhill therefore undeniably breached his contract
with Mosell Equities.

IV. AS THE VERDICT WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE GREAT WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE,
A NEW TRIAL IS WARRANTED, AND A DIFFERENT OUTCOME IS LIKELY
To grant a new trial, the judge must also conclude that a different result would follow a retrial. Heitz
v. Carroll, 117 Idaho 373, 378, 788 P.2d 188, 193 (1990). "This standard requires more than a mere
possibility; there must be a probability that a different result would be obtained in a new trial." Sheridan v.
St. Luke's Reg. Med. Ctr., 135 Idaho 775, 782, 25 P.3d 88, 9514 (2001).

If the Court were to find the verdict is "not in accord with his assessment of the clear weight of
the evidence," then the rational conclusion is some force, other than the logical and reasoned
interpretation of the evidence caused the particular result. Therefore, it is expressed in such a ruling "the
verdict is not in accord with his assessment of the clear weight of the evidence," a new trial is warranted
and a different result is likely.
Moreover, as the Court ruled in granting the JNOV there was an express contract. During the
new trial, the jury will be instructed there was an express contract, so a different verdict is undeniable.

V. JNOV ON ONE ELEMENT OF A CAUSE OF ACTION
The Supreme Court was critical of the Court's decision granting JNOV on its finding there was a
contract. However, by remanding the Supreme Court is acknowledging this issue may be addressed at
summary judgment when a new trial is scheduled. Mosell Equities agrees Exhibit 1 is not ambiguous
and is a valid contract, as are each check that Mosell Equities delivered to Berryhill that was marked
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"loan," and which Berryhill accepted with the unambiguous term "loan" clearly annotated on each
document.
CONCLUSION
In 27 years on the bench, this Court stated it was "shocked" only twice when it heard the verdict.

The Court also stated this was one of the cases. This verdict was against the clear weight of the
evidence, and as it "shocked" the Court, Mosell Equities is entitled to a new trial. Again, if the Supreme
Court, having reviewed the entire trial transcript and evidence, believed there was no basis upon which
this Court could have granted a Motion for New Trial, it is unlikely the Supreme Court would have
remanded this case for further review and decision by this Court. The reality, justice is served by
granting Mosell Equities a new trial, and allowing it to move for summary judgment on the issues
addressed by the JNOV decision. In the alternative, a terrible injustice would result if Mr. Berryhill is
allowed to "take only one side of the sword."
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of May, 2013.

Eric R. Clark
For the Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3rd day of May, 2012, I served the foregoing, by having two
true and complete copies delivered via the manner indicated to:

Judge Dennis Goff
Copies delivered to Chambers for delivery to Judge Goff

Daniel E. Williams

THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP

Via facsimile

121 N. 9th St. Suite 300
P.O. Box 1776
Boise, ID 83701

ERIC R. CLARK
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DANIEL E. WILLIAMS (ISB 3920)
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP
121 N. 9th St., Suite 300
P. 0. Box 1776
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone (208) 345-7800
Fax: (208) 345-7894
danw@thomaswilliamslaw.com

JUN O4 2013
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By ANNAMARIE MEYER
DEPl.."rY

Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited
Liability Company,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an Idaho
corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as
husband and wife,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV OC 0909974
MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
FOLLOWING APPEAL AND
REMAND

Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc., by and through its counsel ofrecord, pursuant to
the stipulation of counsel, hereby submits its Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion
for New Trial Following Appeal and Remand.
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INTRODUCTION
After a unanimous jury found for Defendant on Plaintiffs breach of contract claim and
after the Idaho Supreme Court unanimously found that, based on the evidence, reasonable minds
could have reached the very same conclusion as the jury, Plaintiff now asserts that these findings
are against the "clear weight" of the evidence and it is entitled to a new trial. Despite these same
findings, Plaintiff must also convince this Court there is a "probability," not just a possibility,
that a different result would be obtained in a new trial. Upon a thorough review of the
conflicting evidence in this case, this Court cannot make the requisite findings to justify a new
trial as to the breach of contract claim.

OVERVIEW
As this Court will recall, this is a case of a failed business relationship between a former
Eagle developer and a Boise restauranteur. The sole owner and managing member of Plaintiff
Mosell Equities, LLC, ("Mosell Equities" or "Plaintiff'), Glenn E. Mosell ("Mosell"), was the
developer of a proposed development near Sunnyslope in Canyon County, Idaho, to be known as
"Polo Cove" (Tr., Vol. I, p. 160, L. 21 ). In the summer of 2005, Mosell approached John
Berryhill ("Mr. Berryhill"), sole shareholder and president of Berryhill & Company, Inc., about
opening a restaurant within the development. Mosell Equities then began paying Mr. Berryhill as
a consultant on the Polo Cove development. Ultimately, however, Mosell discussed a different
relationship between them, which would allow Mr. Berryhill to participate in Polo Cove profits
beyond daily restaurant operations. The parties agreed to "blend" certain of their activities and
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form a new entity called MoBerry Ventures or similar names. Berryhill & Company would
contribute its name, restaurant operations and expertise and Mosell Equities would contribute
cash to buy into the new combined entity.
Corporate documents for a MoBerry entity went through some drafts with attorneys, but
were never finalized or executed. Nevertheless, on approximately June 28, 2007, Mosell
Equities made its first cash contribution. In a handwritten note on a copy of the check, which is
signed by John Berryhill and Glenn Mosell (referred to as Exhibit 1), there appears the following:
This is a loan from Mosell Equities to cover some misc. downtown expenses
during our bookeeper [sic] transition. It will go into the general check register &
be used for any billing of payables needed for downtown or Berryhill & Co. I1
will be transitioned into part of Glenn's "buy in" ofMoberry Venture Corp. Inc.
(emphasis added)
Subsequently, Mosell Equities made further contributions by check, some of which
referenced the term "loan" and some of which did not. When Mr. Berryhill asked Mosell about
the reference to a "loan," Mosell responded: "we have to call it something." Mosell later
acknowledged that the "loan" was only an "interim substitute." The bulk of Mosell Equities'
cash contribution went to tenant improvements at a new downtown Boise restaurant location,
plus a later, large expansion at the same location, including a "Polo Cove" showroom.
Mosell ultimately abandoned the Polo Cove development. Mosell Equities then brought
this action based on several legal theories premised on the fact that there was a simple loan
transaction between the parties, nothing more. The jury found for Defendant Berryhill &
Company on all these theories, including breach of contract, breach of an implied-in-fact contract
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and unjust enrichment. 1 Later, this Court granted Plaintiffs motion for JNOV on one element of
the express contract claim, believing it should have instructed the jury that Exhibit 1 constituted a
contract, but it would be up to a second jury to determine what the parties intended by it. This
Court denied Plaintiffs motion for JNOV and new trial on the remaining counts. Thereafter, the
Idaho Supreme Court reversed the order granting Plaintiffs motion for JNOV on Count I and
remanded.
Below, Defendant reviews the trial record at some length to demonstrate that the clear
weight of the evidence was not contrary to the jury's verdict regarding Count I.

STATEMENT OF FACTS 2
The sole owner and managing member of Plaintiff Mosell Equities, Glenn E. Mosell, was
the developer of a proposed development near Sunnyslope in Canyon County, Idaho, to be
known as "Polo Cove." Mosell testified:
There was a vineyard for sale around 2004 and 2005 that was listed, it was on the
market, and a realtor show- took me out there, showed it to me. And it's in the
Sunnyslope area of Canyon County. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 159, L. 9)
So - I assembled a few pieces. And they referred to 290 acres or 300 acres was the
original block. And I was looking to probably sub-divide it into five-acre little
gentleman farms, little vineyards, and sub-divide and sell five-acre parcels. After

The jury found for Plaintiff on a count for conversion regarding a very small
amount of furniture and awarded $2,016.85. The jury also found for Defendant John E. Berryhill
individually on a fraud-in-the-inducement claim.
Defendant further refers the Court to Section I of the Idaho Supreme Court's
Decision of February 22, 2013, entitled "Factual Background," which is hereby incorporated by
reference. Mosel/ Equities, LLC v. Berryhill & Co.,_ Idaho_, 297 P.3d 232,240 (Idaho
2013).
2
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a little while ... we decided to maybe propose a winery, or a wine country
restaurant at that site. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 160, L. 21)
Masell had experience in the development field. He grew up in Southern California and
graduated from UC San Diego in the early 1980s (Tr., Vol. I, p. 158, L. 9). He was an economics
major and ultimately obtained his Series 6 license, working as an investment broker (Tr., Vol. I,
p. 328, L. 1). Masell moved to Boulder, Colorado, and started a development called Mill
Village. Eventually, Masell and his partner had a "difference of opinion in vision" and Masell
was bought out prior to any construction having begun (Tr., Vol. I, p. 328, L. 24).
Masell subsequently pursued a development in San Marcos that he ultimately walked
away from and nothing was built (Tr., Vol. I, p. 332, L. 2). In Fredericksburg, Texas, Masell put
some land under contract intending to develop it and then decided not to go forward (Tr., Vol. I,
p. 332, L. 13). After moving to Idaho in 2000, Masell became involved in a development known
as Iron Horse in Cascade where disagreements arose and that development ended, nothing having
been built (Tr., Vol. I, p. 334, L. 6).
In July of 2005, Masell approached the owner and President of Defendant Berryhill &
Company, John Berryhill, initially about building a restaurant within the Polo Cove development
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 160, L. 21). Regarding the evolution of his relationship with Mr. Berryhill relative
to his restaurant and Polo Cove, Masell testified:
I just called and left a message, introduced myself as a developer, asking if he was
interested in building a wine country restaurant, and just left a message. (Tr., Vol.
I, p. 160, L. 25)
I recognized that he [Mr. Berryhill] was a local chef with a following. (Tr., Vol. I,
p. 161, L. 20). For Boise, he's fairly well-known. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 161, L. 24)
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He [Mr. Berryhill] expressed interest in being a part of the vin - vineyard venture.
And so, I paid him, as a consult, to help design a restaurant, and how it would lay
out on the hill, and I ultimately paid him $25,000 in consulting fees. (Tr., Vol. I,
p. 166, L. 5)
[Mr. Berryhill could] offer insight, as a restaurateur, on how a restaurant might be
designed, or how many tables in a certain area, or kitchen layout. (Tr., Vol. I, p.
175, L. 9)
In addition to utilizing Mr. Berryhill's knowledge and expertise in designing restaurants,
Masell intended to build a Berryhill & Company restaurant ("Berryhill Restaurant") within the
Polo Cove development and intended that Mr. Berryhill would participate in the ultimate success
of the project.
I'm a partner in Polo Cove. So, ifl was a partner in a restaurant venture, then I
can bring opportunities to that restaurant or add whatever skill set I might have,
you know and that - that comes with a real estate background. And so, we looked
at the opportunities even in downtown Boise; all right? But if I was a part of a
restaurant, half owner of a restaurant, then maybe I would pursue opportunities
where a restaurant would be an amenity to the project. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 171, L. 3)

***
I paid John Berryhill $25,000 for consulting work, to work toward design of a
restaurant at Polo Cove. When we agreed on the buy-in - or the sale of half of his
company to me, at that point the consulting fee wasn't appropriate. He would be
working toward a common goal of opportunity at Polo Cove, and so [sic]. (Tr.,
Vol. I, p. 241, L. 14; emphasis added)
Masell also acknowledged that the Berryhill name and reputation increased the value of
the development.

Q:

Let me ask you about another one. Merely by him, meaning Berryhill,
branding the restaurant, overseeing those operations, with really no need
for him to invest his own monies in that real estate, he would enhance the
value of the surrounding vineyard and uses.
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A:

Correct.

(Tr., Vol. I, p. 360, L. 6)
Q:

And so, you paid the $400,000, and it was in part to recognize the value of
the Berryhill name?

A:

Correct.

(Tr. Vol. I, p. 362, Ll.14-16)
Q:

A.

And is it fair to say that the PKF Consulting Group, in their feasibility
study, indicated that Mr. Berryhill's strong and loyal following added or
increased the feasibility of the overall development?

Correct.

(Tr. Vol. I, p. 366, LL 11-16; Defendant's Exhibit JJJ, p. 6).
Mosell ordered Polo Cove business cards for Mr. Berryhill with the title of "Partner" (Tr.,
Vol. I, p. 603, L. 6-16; Defendant's Exhibit N). Mr. Berryhill did not recall any other Polo Cove
cards referring to partner (Tr., Vol. I, p. 605, L. 6).
Mosell initially contemplated a small, wine-country development of 290 acres. Robert
Taunton, a consultant for Polo Cove, testified as follows:
At the time that I started working on the project [2007], the first phase of
the Polo Cove overall project, which is roughly about 300 acres, was in
public hearings in front of the Planning Commission out in Canyon
County for a conditional use permit. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 196, L. 6-10)
And then, after that we started working on a larger scale planning project
for the total property which was 1,600 acres. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 196, L. 16)
I thought that the initial development approval on the 300 acres, which
was a winery, hotel, restaurant, education facility, and some residential in
the - I the vines, really had a lot of merit and had potential in the
marketplace. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 202, L. 11-15)
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The project more than quintupled, expanding from 290 acres to 1,600 acres. The Polo
Cove Executive Overview was circulated to potential investors (Tr., Vol. I, p. 201, LL 9-18).
The Executive Overview drafted on behalf of Plaintiff dated June 18, 2008 states that, in addition
to the 290 original acres, it "secured and funded land options for approximately 1,100 acres
adjacent to the resort and winery parcel" (Defendant's Exhibit DDD, page 13). The Illustrative
Map drafted by Plaintiffs architect (Ibid, page 16) shows that a charter school, education center,
artisan center, interpretive center, winemakers lodge, fire stations, health and wellness center,
sporting center, parks, storage barns, water reclamation facility, polo and event fields, an
equestrian center and an amphitheater, were just some of the intended attractions.
Mr. Berryhill testified regarding Plaintiffs Exhibit 25, reading from a portion as
follows:
For - for the new downtown location of his restaurant, John Berryhill has recently
partnered with developer Glenn Mosell. The two are also developing Polo Cove,
a 1,600-acre living and resort community in the Snake River Valley Appalachian.
A Berryhill' s restaurant will anchor a boutique hotel, vineyard homes, a winery,
spa, sporting club, and an equestrian center with polo fields. Catering and special
events will be a primary focus, with vineyard weddings and receptions, festivals,
concerts, and corporate events. Polo Cove is 30 minutes from Boise and is
surrounded by 360 degree views of the Owyhee Mountains and the Boise
Foothills.
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 575, L. 15-p. 576, L.l; Plaintiffs Exhibit 25).
Steve Inch, owner of Propel Communications, with 25 years of marketing and brand
development experience, was an independent contractor working with Mogul Development
Group, in partnership with Mosell, and was hired to create a package to present to potential
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investors of Polo Cove (Tr., Vol. I, p. 853, L. 6). When asked about his understanding of the role
of the Berryhill Restaurant with regard to a gourmet restaurant at Polo Cove, Mr. Inch stated:
My understanding was that there was some type of partnership arrangement
between Polo Cove development and Berryhill, and that Berryhill was the
restaurant that would be a key draw to potential guests to the development itself,
on - in the early stages. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 855, L. 15)

***
... [I]t was presented in a way, to me, that Berryhill is involved in this
development, and that they were - the Berryhill name is an important part of the
development itself. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 855, L. 25)
Mr. Inch stated that the Berryhill name had a "pretty high equity" in terms of the local
marketplace and explained that as follows:
A:

Well, we're - one of the things that is - is important to understand is,
when you're creating a new development it's an- an issue of point of
difference in the marketplace. What makes Polo Cove unique to another
development that maybe have similar amenities?
And my understanding is that - and I think rightly so - bringing on a name
such as Berryhill, and that brand equity that exists in the marketplace,
which means - there's brand equity and there's brand image, and they're
very different.

***
Q:

When you - when you're talking about leveraging someone's brand
equity, can you put that in layman's terms.

A:

Michael Jordan and Nike. If - whether or not Nike sells a shoe or not,
they still pay for the value of the Michael Jordan name. This is similarly
what I believe was done at Polo Cove. That without having anything other
than the vineyards and the beautiful views, which are tremendous,
Berryhill was something someone could touch, feel, taste, and realize as
being in existence, thus adding credibility to the development.
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And the reality is, there's a-years of investment in that name and there's
value in that.
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 856, L. 10)
Mr. Berryhill devoted substantial amounts of time to the Polo Cove venture, working
with the original architects, running the architect group, coordinating the efforts of the web
designer and art direction. During that whole time, Mr. Berryhill was trying to put Mosell's
vision to paper, getting it developed to build (Tr., Vol. I, p. 680, L. 3; Defendant's Exhibit
FFFF). Mr. Berryhill did so upon his understanding with Mosell, as Mosell testified above, that
Mr. Berryhill would participate in the Polo Cove profits beyond operation of the restaurant (Tr.,
Vol. I, p. 359, L. 21 -p. 360, L. 5).
At Mosell's urging, the Berryhill Restaurant moved to downtown Boise at the Plaza 121
location. Mosell told Mr. Berryhill that they needed a sexy space, something better than a strip
mall, where the Berryhill restaurant was previously located. And downtown has - is "sexy" (Tr.,
Vol. I, p. 579, L. 23). They also needed a place to "wine and dine" investors and to show "the
essence of what we were developing at Polo Cove" (Tr., Vol. I, p. 580, L. 4). Mr. Berryhill
testified that Mosell wanted a sexy place downtown: "I can't bring my clients that are going to
invest a million dollars to an ugly strip mall behind a Firestone Tire Store. I need a sexy place so
we can sell this, so we can sell you, so we can sell the Berryhill name" (Tr., Vol. I, p. 716, LL 1319).
Mr. Berryhill started the Berryhill Restaurant in March of 1998 (Tr., Vol. I, p. 427, L. 22).
The restaurant was originally in the 8th Street Marketplace in downtown Boise, however it had to

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
FOLLOWING APPEAL AND REMAND, P. 10

000048

be relocated due to the demolition and reconstruction of BODO. Mr. Berryhill moved the
restaurant to a strip mall on Broadway Avenue in Boise (Tr., Vol. I, p. 582, L. 3). Mr. Berryhill
wanted to eventually move downtown but testified as to why he agreed to move at that time as
follows:
I was fine in an ugly strip mall hidden behind a Firestone Tire store in what used
to be a condom shop, doing wonderful. I had always loved downtown. I was
downtown before, and I was in the Downtown Business Association before. Yes,
I love downtown. I would love to go back to downtown. I did not go to 120 [sic]
North Ninth Street because I wanted to be back downtown. I went there because
your client [Mosell] and I, together, chose this sexy restaurant to spearhead Polo
Cove. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 476, L. 14)
I - I didn't have a - I liked downtown, I enjoyed downtown, I enjoyed being a part
of the DBA when I was down there previously. The First Thursdays that go on,
there's a lot of activity that went on being downtown. I didn't have that being out
on Broadway. However, I wasn't seeking space. I had no timeline or- I don't
think I ever voiced, even in my head, that I ever wanted to go back downtown. I
didn't have a - I didn't have a view of - or vision, or projection of going back
downtown. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 582, LI. 8-17)
When asked if it was Mosell's idea to move the restaurant downtown, Mr. Berryhill
responded:
Absolutely ... He [Mosell] was meeting with investors that wanted to open a
restaurant for a million dollars a key. He did not want to take them to a strip mall.
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 477, LI. 2-9)
Mr. Berryhill further testified regarding Mosell's attempts to identify potential
downtown restaurant locations:
He [Mosell] started finding properties that - that originally you would have to
build out and, I assume, use a builder. Properties like where the Spaghetti Factory
is, used to be Louie's. And we went and looked at it, and he was talking about he
had already found out that you could build, on top of it, condos and actually even
go taller than the phone - I believe it's the phone company building beside it, to
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view - there was no variance, I believe was the term, that you couldn't build on
top. That was - that was one .... He talked to commercial real estate brokers,
another developer. We both met with Gary Christensen and Robert Kaylor of R.
Grey, who started the R. Grey Lofts where the AppleOne building is, where
AppleOne - or iPod, down at Eighth Street, to buy that space. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 580,
L. 19-p.581, L. 15)
Mr. Berryhill testified that Mosell took the lead in identifying a new downtown location
because Mr. Berryhill was busy running his restaurant was not a real estate broker (Tr., Vol. I, p.
581, LI. 18-23).
Mosell and Mr. Berryhill had previously hired an attorney, Kimbell Gourley, in relation to
a purchase and sale contract for the purchase of a strip mall on Broadway A venue in Boise (Tr.,
Vol. I, p. 826, L. 16). They met with Mr. Gourley again on March 6, 2007 to discuss the
proposed formation of a new corporation to be known as MoBerry Corporation (Tr., Vol. I, p.
827, L. 23). Mr. Gourley's understanding was that Mr. Berryhill and Mosell Equities were to
become shareholders of this new corporation (Tr., Vol. I, p. 827, L. 23). Mr. Gourley
subsequently sent drafts of the documents to the parties, leaving blanks because the parties had
not resolved everything. When asked if it was his understanding that the transaction was going
to take the form of a loan from Mosell Equities to Berryhill & Company, Mr. Gourley responded:
The term - to my recollection, the term loan was never used. I never understood
that there was going to be a loan that was made. And to be honest with you, it
would be inconsistent with - with a capital contribution into a corporation. And
so, I - nobody discussed that with me. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 829, L. 19)
The lease for the new downtown restaurant space at Plaza 121 was signed on April 12,
2007 (Tr., Vol. I, p. 681, L. 9; Plaintiffs Exhibit FFFF); both Mosell and Mr. Berryhill signed
the Personal Guaranty for the lease (Tr., Vol. I, p. 885, L. 3; Plaintiffs Exhibit G). On June 28,
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2007 (approximately two months after the lease was signed), Mosell wrote a check to Berryhill &
Company, for $50,000. In a handwritten note on a copy of the check is the following notation:
This is a loan from Mosell Equities to cover some misc. downtown expenses
during our bookkeeper transition. It will go into the general check register & be
used for any billing of payables needed for downtown or Berryhill & Co.
It will be transitioned into part of Glenn's "buy in" of Mo Berry Venture Corp. Inc.
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 147, L. 13; Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 [emphasis added])
The parties had never discussed loans and when Mr. Berryhill was asked what he
understood the money to be, he testified, "Well, I never understood it to be a loan. We never
discussed it as a loan" (Tr., Vol. I, p. 441, L. 19). Mr. Berryhill further testified:
At the - at that time, I had - I saw nothing wrong with it because Glenn and I
never discussed this money that he paid as a loan .... The word loan never came
up until I saw that he wrote on the check. And I asked, we're doing this thing, this
is not a loan, why are you writing a loan? And he said we have to classify it as
something. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 443, LL 12-19)
I believe my original testimony was that that word is a loan, and it was given to
me by [Mosell], and - however, I did not have, at the time, an issue with it,
because I turned and asked him, is - and I'm actually referring to the loan on the
check, not the loan that I wrote below - and I asked him, well, this is not a loan.
And he said, we have to call it something. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 523, L. 23)
I understood Glenn to say that it was not a loan, but we had to call it something,
so we could put it on the books and just park it so it would have - it wouldn't
have to move until we signed the documents, and put in on a specific tax year. It
could sit there. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 788, L. 16)
From June 28, 2007 to April 30, 2008, Mosell wrote checks totaling $405,000 (Plaintiffs
Exhibits 2-11.) When asked if he noticed that some, but not all, of the checks have the word loan
written in the memo line, Berryhill testified that he did not see all of the checks until the lawsuit
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due to the fact that the checks went to his general manager at the time (Tr., Vol. I, p. 590, L. 25p. 591, L. 9).
When asked if he thought it was a loan, Mr. Berryhill testified:
My understanding today, what the plaintiff is saying this loan means, is not what I
understood when this was written, because that's not what he said. We never
talked about that he could get it back. We never talked about it being a short-term
loan. It was, as he stated, an inter- interim substitute. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 587, L. 4-9)
Mr. Berryhill also testified that there was no doubt in his mind, at that time, that the
transition would occur (Tr., Vol. I, p. 586, L. 22).
Although Mosell had an economics degree and extensive real estate and financial
experience, he never presented Mr. Berryhill with a note or any other documents relating to any
purported "loan" (Tr., Vol. I, p. 593, L. 21). For his part, Mr. Berryhill testified that he has no
legal or accounting training (Tr., Vol. I, p. 585, LL 9-13).
The parties never signed the documents drafted by Mr. Gourley. In December, 2007, the
parties met with Amy Dempsey, a CPA with the firm Riche, Dempsey & Associates, Chartered.
The parties told Ms. Dempsey that they had some joint business proceedings dealing with a
development called Polo Cove and that the expertise of both parties was required to put the
project together. She understood that the name-brand of Berryhill & Company would be an
anchor to the development and a draw for people who were going to be buying into Polo Cove as
well as staying there (Tr., Vol. I, p. 792, L. 11 ). The parties further explained that the move from
the strip mall to downtown would bump up the image of Berryhill & Company. The parties
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would also have a front for Polo Cove where people walking downtown could obtain information
on Polo Cove (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 793, L. 19).
Ms. Dempsey testified that the parties had several meetings to try to put something
together to understand the end goal of the parties, of what exactly was taking place (Tr., Vol. I, p.
794, L. 1) . When asked if she, after several meetings, understood what the parties were trying to
achieve, Ms. Dempsey replied, "I do not." She stated the reason was "Because I could never get
a straight answer, from either Glenn or John, on what we would put together, if that is exactly
what they were trying to achieve" (Tr., Vol. I, p. 794, L. 17).
Ms. Dempsey further testified that she understood there were funds from Mosell being
deposited into the Berryhill Restaurant account. When asked what understanding she gained
from her meetings with Mosell regarding those funds, Ms. Dempsey replied:
There was no clear definition of what the monies were for because there was a lot
of activity that was going on from - where John was working out of the Broadway
location to moving downtown. There was a lot of expenses being incurred to
move forward this idea of Polo Cove.
So, these monies going in - at one point in time, we just didn't have an
explanation for it. And that is why we had meetings and trying to define it, as
well as meetings with attorneys to get documents signed, because nothing was
ever clearly defined by the two parties of what exactly those monies were for.
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 795, LL 3-14).
When asked if she recalled asking Mosell that question, she replied that Mosell told her, "Well,
just when we get there, we' 11 get there (Tr., Vol. I, p. 795, L. 19).
Ms. Dempsey further testified regarding any purported "loan:"
Q.

What did Mr. Mosell say to you, if anything, about the funds being a loan?
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A.

Well, he never was really clear if it was a loan, or if it was compensation
for John's services for consulting fees, or if it was reimbursement of build
out for the Polo Cove space. There was nothing ever clearly defined. It
would just change from one day to the next so to speak.

Q.

Did you ask John the same question?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you get any clear answer?

A.

No.

Q.

Who did you expect to answer that question?

A.

Well, I expected that Glenn would have an answer for me because it was
him putting the money in, and because the money was kind of coming in
piecemeal as they were moving towards their goal. It's not like it was one
lump sum transferred in at one point in time.

Q.

How was - how were those funds accounted for in the Berryhill &
Company books?

A.

There were coded as what is termed a long-term liability.

Q.

And what did that signify.

A.

What that signified to me is that it was in a holding pattern until we had
legal documentation to define how I was going to be able to treat those
from an accounting standpoint.

(Tr., Vol. I, p. 796, LI - p. 797, L. 2)
Mosell never told Ms. Dempsey that the funds were considered a loan and never provided
her with a copy of Exhibit 1 (Tr., Vol. I, p. 798, L. 1). Mosell testified that he considered the
funds to be an "interim substitute" until his buy-in of MoBerry Venture Corp. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 321,
L. 25- p. 323, L. 16).
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James Tomlinson, is in the commercial real estate business in Boise and is the head of a
group of investors that own and operate the building located at Plaza 121 where Berryhill's
Restaurant moved in August 2007 (Tr., Vol. I, p. 881, LL 17-23). Mr. Tomlinson testified that
when his company received a letter of intent from Berryhill, Inc. [sic] to rent the space at Plaza
121, they questioned who the partners were and were told "the two of them" referring to
Berryhill and Mosell (Tr., Vol. I, p. 884, L. 13-17). Mr. Tomlinson further testified:
I didn't get a sense as to what - who owned the stock. Berryhill was a
corporation, and - and I was told that these two folks owned it. And they both
had agreed to sign a guarantee. And so, that was the limit to my investigation, I
guess, of - Berryhill Company, so. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 894, LL 15-20)

***
Obviously, I was told by them, because we then gave each of them a signature
card authorizing us to investigate their background, and we asked each of them to
sign a guarantee. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 895, LL 3-6)
Mr. Tomlinson also testified that a few months after Berryhill & Company's restaurant
moved into Plaza 121, he was approached by Mosell and Mr. Berryhill regarding leasing
additional space at Plaza 121. His understanding was that it would be used for Polo Cove. He
admitted he was "lukewarm" and talked to one or both of the parties several times before finally
agreeing to the expansion. There would be a retail storefront that would give exposure to the
Polo Cove concept (Tr., Vol. I, p. 886, L. 21 - p. 887, L. 2).
Mr. Tomlinson further testified that during one of his tours of the expansion space,
Mosell was "waving his hands and talking about where computers would be located, and how
they would be packed up and moved into a backroom in the evenings, so that the - the retail
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space could be converted to more of a lounge and - and a multi-use space." (Tr., Vol. I, p. 887,
LI. 20-24).
When Mr. Berryhill was asked whose idea it was to lease the expansion space, he testified
that it was Mosell's. Mr. Berryhill further testified that he tried to put together various scenarios
because he was concerned about the cost. However, Mosell advised Mr. Berryhill that he would
fund the new banquet and ballroom and Polo Cove would fund the show room. (Tr., Vol. I, p.
626, L. 12- p. 628, L. 25). Mr. Berryhill testified that Mosell wanted a showroom to showcase
Polo Cove; to have a "sexy office" with visual aids, posters and pictures of the development.
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 622, LI. 17-24).
Mosell Equities paid rent for the Expansion Area/Polo Cove Showroom for a total of
eight months, the last check dated July 17, 2008. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 674, L. 10 - p. 675, L6;
Defendant's Exhibit 00.) Mosell made no further payment. At the time of trial, the amount
owing for the expansion space was $149,255.01 (Tr., Vol. I, p. 632, L. 9).
When asked about Plaintiffs Exhibit 11, the $20,000 check with "Suite 101 Tis" on the
memo line, and what relationship that check had with the buy-in of Mosell Equities, Mr.
Berryhill testified:
Our agreement on the Tis for the expansion space would be that Berryhill would
pay for part of it, the ballrooms, and Polo Cove would pay for the Polo Cove
space. And this 20,000 was the Tis for the Polo Cave - Polo Cove Suite 101
space .... He said that - and we both agreed - that this - the Tis for Polo Cove
did not go into the buy-in. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 616, L. 4-17)
When asked if Mosell ever provided the full amount agreed to complete the buy-in of
Mosell Equities, Mr. Berryhill replied, "He did not" (Tr., Vol. I, p. 616, LI. 18-21).
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Mr. Berryhill testified that the cost to remodel the restaurant was $100,048.43 and the
cost for the expansion space was $193,801.29, for a total of $293,849.72 (Tr., Vol. I, p. 688, L.
23 - p. 690, L. 14; Defendant's Exhibit CCC-I). Mosell did not dispute that the final tenant
improvements totaled approximately $300,000 (Tr., Vol. I, p. 327, L. 5-20). Mosell testified that
the original estimate for Tis to the downtown location was only $50,000 (Tr., Vol. I, p. 346, L.
18 - p. 34 7, L. 6; Plaintiff's Exhibit 19) (emphasis added).
James Tomlinson also testified that under the terms of the lease for Plaza 121, the only
items that could be removed at the termination of the lease would be "tables and chairs,
effectively moveable equipment." He also referenced paragraph 12 of the lease: "All alterations,
additions and improvements, except fixtures which shall not become part of the building, shall
remain in and be surrendered with the premises as a part thereof at the termination of this lease"
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 889, LI. 2-24; Defendant's Exhibit G). Thus, the bulk of the funds provided by
Mosell Equities went to tenant improvements of the restaurant and "expansion space," which
will remain with the building at the expiration of any lease.
At the same time Mosell stopped paying rent on the Polo Cove showroom, he began to
address the subject of the contributions made by Mosell Equities. At first he indicated that he
"would like to look at owning fewer shares and getting some cash back" (Tr., Vol. I, p. 324, LI.
10-12).
In a subsequent email to Mr. Berryhill dated September 9, 2008, Mosell wrote: "John ...
We need to get together to talk about my investment/divestment in Berryhill and 'lease' ... Let
me know when you're available ... " (Tr., Vol. I, p. 414, LI. 10-15; Defendant's Exhibit MMM, p.
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3). On October 6, 2008, Mosell again wrote, "John ... I think it's time to discuss our positions
again .. When are you available this week ... I'd also like to go over my capital contributions with
John ... Thanks ... Glenn" (Tr. Vol. I., p. 415, L. 25 - p. 416, L. 12; Plaintiffs Exhibit 38).
In none of these communications did Mosell refer to the transactions as a "loan."
Yet, on May 28, 2009, Mosell Equities filed this action against Defendants Berryhill &
Company, John Berryhill and Amy Berryhill for theories of recovery all based on the false
premise that the series of transactions constituted nothing more than a simple loan.
In its Memorandum, Plaintiff largely relies on its own witnesses and draws inferences
consistently in its own favor. Not satisfied at that, Plaintiff also recharacterizes the record
starting early in its Brief. Regarding Exhibit 1, Plaintiff claims that "Mosell testified he asked
Berryhill to write the note [Exhibit 1] as 'security' for my $50,000.00 check,"' and cites to (Tr.
Vol. I, p. 315, L. 3 - p. 318, L.11) (Plaintiffs Memorandum: 9). The actual testimony at that part
of the transcript is: "Well, as security for my $50,000 check, I relied on John Berryhill's signature
stating that it was a loan to be ultimately converted to equity in the new venture."
Whether the parties intended Exhibit 1 to constitute an actual "loan" was obviously
disputed, a fact Plaintiff will not face. John Berryhill testified:
My understanding today, what the plaintiff is saying this loan means, is not what I
understood when this was written, because that's not what he said. We never
talked about that he could get it back. We never talked about it being a short-term
loan. It was, as he stated, an inter - interim substitute.
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 587, LL 4-9). The attorney working for the parties on the anticipated "buy-in" for
"MoBerry Venture Corp," Kimbell Gourley, testified:

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
FOLLOWING APPEAL AND REMAND, P. 20

000058

•
Q.

In that regard, was it ever your understanding, and in conversations with Mr.
Mosell or Mr. Berryhill, that the transaction was going to take the form of a loan
from Mosell Equities to Berryhill & Company?

A.

The term - to my recollection, the term loan was never used. I never understood
that there was going to be a loan that was made. And to be honest with you, it
would be inconsistent with -- with a capital contribution into a corporation. And
so, I - nobody discussed that with me.

(Tr. Vol. I, p. 829, LI. 14-24).
When testifying about his efforts to develop and market the Polo Cove development,
Glenn Mosell testified:
Q.

Isn't it true that, nevertheless, the value of what you're trying to sell or to develop
[Polo Cove] was greater because of the Berryhill name?

A.

And that's exactly why I paid $400,000 for half of the business, to use that name
and to brand the wine country restaurant out there; true.

Q.

And so, you paid the $400,000, and it was in part to recognize the value of the
Berryhill name?

A.

Correct.

(Tr. Vol. I, p. 362, LI. 8-16)
Elsewhere, upon further questioning regarding his desire to have the Berryhill brand as
part of the Polo Cove development, Mosell testified:
Q.

If you recall, am I correct, Mr. Mosell, that this is the table - the first page, the
table of contents, of your attorney Todd Lakey's submittal to the Canyon County
Planning and Zoning Commission regarding the Polo Cove development?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And again, similar language on page six, if we can flip to it, under 3.2.2,
restaurant, there's similar language about one of the southwest Idaho's most sought
after chefs, do you see that?
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A.

Correct.

Q.

And it's referred to your attorney, to planning and zoning in Canyon County, that
he plans to build a centerpiece restaurant at the summit of the vineyards; correct?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And then, it goes on to talk about John being one of the - also one of the most
successful and prolific caterers in the state -

A.

Yes.

Q.

-- correct? And you agreed with the language in that submission to Canyon
County, didn't you?

A.

Absolutely. That's why I paid $25,000 for John's consulting work and then
$400,000 for that branding.

{Tr. Vol. I, p. 366, L. 23 - p. 367, L. 23).
Thus, at trial, even Plaintiffs own principal, Glenn Mosell, did not consistently refer to
the check funds as a loan and acknowledged they reflected rather the "buy-in," as well as
Plaintiffs desire to purchase the Berryhill brand.
Based on this evidence, as well as that described above, the jury rightly concluded that the
parties did not intend a loan. Accordingly, there was no breach of a loan contract, because of
Berryhill & Company's refusal to pay back the funds as if they were a loan.

ARGUMENT
The only issue remaining in this action is whether Plaintiff can make the requisite
showing regarding its motion for new trial as to Count I for breach of contract. The only basis
for new trial preserved is that under Rule 59(a)(6), I.R.C.P., based on the insufficiency of the
evidence to justify the verdict.
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The reguisite standard under Rule 59(a)(6) reguires more than disagreement
with the verdict.

According to the Idaho Supreme Court, in deciding a new trial motion "[t]he judge does
not have unlimited authority to disturb the verdict of a jury. Respect for the function of the jury
prevents the granting of a new trial except in unusual circumstances." Warren v. Sharp, 139
Idaho 599, 603, 83 P.3d 773, 777 (2003), quoting, Pratton v. Gage, 122 Idaho 848, 850, 840 P.2d
392, 394 (1992). Under the similar federal rule, "[w ]hat courts cannot do ... and what the district
court here never purported to do ... is to grant a new trial 'simply because [the court] would have
come to a different conclusion than the jury did."' Peterson v. Wilson, 141 F.3d 573,577 (5th
Cir. Tex. 1998), quoting, 25 Fed. Proc., L. Ed.§ 58.13 (1984); see also, Latino v. Kaizer, 58 F.3d
310, 314 (9 th Cir. 1995) (ruling that jury's verdict should be accorded greater deference under
Rule 59 in cases involving simple issues with highly disputed facts, than in cases involving
complex issues with facts that are not as disputed).
Under Rule 59(a)(6), I.R.C.P., the trial court must "determine (1) whether the verdict is
against his or her view of the clear weight of the evidence; and (2) whether a new trial would
produce a different result." Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., 152 Idaho 741,751,274 P.3d 1256, 1266
(2012) (emphasis added), quoting, Schwan's Sales Enters., Inc. v. Idaho Transp. Dep't, 142 Idaho
826,833, 136 P.3d 297,304 (2006); see also, Hudelson v. Delta Int'/ Mach Corp., 142 Idaho
244,248, 127 P.3d 147, 151 (2005); Heitz v. Carroll, 117 Idaho 373, 378, 788 P.2d 188, 193
(1990). Any motion for a new trial based on insufficiency of the evidence must "set forth the
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factual grounds therefor with particularity." Rule 59(a)(7), I.R.C.P; Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 146
Idaho 423, 430, 196 P.3d 341, 348 (2008).
In Johannsen, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed a district court's denial of a motion for
new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a)(6) in a case involving alleged breach of contract and dissolution
of an limited liability company. In so doing, the Court quoted with approval the district court's
analysis:
Here the district court judge stated, 'I exercise my discretion and can only grant
this motion if I'm convinced the verdict is not in accord with the clear weight of
the evidence ... ' He continued, ' .. .it was a good trial, a good issue, and the jury
decided it one way. They could have gone the other way, but they went the way
they did and found no breach of contract.'
146 Idaho at 430. See, also, O'Shea v. High Mark Dev., LLC, 280 P.3d 146, 157-158 (2012)
(approving denial of motion for new trial where district court found that, while it may not
necessarily agree with the jury verdict, it did not find that it was against the clear weight of the
evidence). Accordingly, the "clear weight" standard requires more than disagreement with the
verdict.
As the Supreme Court noted in the appeal of this case, "[t]o grant a new trial, the judge
must also conclude that a different result would follow a retrial." 297 P.3d at 242, citing, Heitz v.
Carroll, supra, 117 Idaho at 378. It also quoted language from Sheridan v. St. Luke's Reg. Med
Ctr., 135 Idaho 775, 782, 25 P.3d 88, 95 (2001): "This standard requires more than a mere

possibility; there must be a probability that a different result would be obtained in a new trial."

Id. Based on a fair evaluation of the conflicting evidence and testimony in this case, this Court is
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not able to conclude that the jury's verdict is contrary to the "clear weight of the evidence," nor
that it is probable that a new trial would produce a different outcome.
2.

The "clear weight" of the evidence was not counter to the jury's verdict.

As it has done throughout the proceedings, rather than engage contrary evidence, Plaintiff
simply ignores it in its current motion. Plaintiff continues to argue that the use of the word
"loan" on Exhibit 1 and certain checks negates any possible outcome other than that all of the
funds at issue were meant to be and would remain a loan regardless of any other evidence or
eventualities. In denying Mosell Equities' motion for directed verdict on Count I, this Court
clearly understood that the "loan" language depended on the parties' intent:
But I can see how there may have been a different intent at the time. So, the issue
as to whether there was a meeting of the minds is something that can be
legitimately pursued and presented to the jury, and the jury will make a decision.
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 556, LI. 7-13). Even when granting Plaintiffs motion for JNOV, this Court did
not pretend that the "loan" language could only have one meaning. At the hearing, this Court
stated: "All I'm doing - I said, I'm setting aside the verdict because, as a matter of law, Exhibit 1
is a contract, a binding contract. What we don't know is what does it mean?" (JNOV Tr., Vol. I,
p. 109, LI. 7-10).
For their part, the parties both treated Exhibit 1 as ambiguous requiring evidence of the
parties' intent at the time. Mosell Equities itself noted this in its requested Jury Instruction based
on IDJI 1.41.2 (R., Vol. I, p. 1026, LI. 10-14). Mo sell Equities further requested a special verdict
that placed the interpretation of the ambiguous contract squarely in front of the jury. In its
"Proposed Verdict Form" Plaintiff sought the following question for the jury at # 1: " ... did the
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parties intend the money Mosell Equities provided, $50,000.00, to be a loan?" At #2, it
requested the following question of the jury: "did the parties intend the money Mosell Equities
provided $50,000.00 to be a loan to remain a loan pending Mosell Equities' "buy-in" of an entity
formed by the parties?" (R., Vol. I, p. 1027, LL 1-4). 3
In the recent case of Idaho Dev., LLC v. Teton View Golf Estates, LLC, 2011 Ida. LEXIS
183 (Idaho Dec. 12, 2011 ), the Idaho Supreme Court had the opportunity to review the standards
to be used when, in the similar context of debt recharacterization, an infusion of funds is to be
considered either a loan or equity. This Court emphasized the proper inquiry is "the true intent of
the parties in entering the transaction." And, "[b ]ecause the question of intent is one of fact, the
determination as to whether to recharacterize an advance as a capital contribution or as a loan is
an issue of fact." 2011 Ida. LEXIS 183, *16. The parties intent "may be inferred from what the
parties say in their contracts, from what they do through their actions, and from the economic
reality of the surrounding circumstances. Answers lie in facts that confer context case-by-case."
2011 Ida. LEXIS 183, *13, quoting, In re SubMicron Sys. Corp., 432 F.3d 448,456 (3rd Cir.
2006).
Here, there was credible evidence to believe that the term "loan" came from Mosell, who
explained "we have to call it something" (Tr., Vol. I, p. 523, L. 23). This conclusion is not based

Because Plaintiff continues to argue that Exhibit 1 is not really ambiguous at all,
but susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation, it is contradicting its own proffered jury
instructions. This Court should ignore any such argument, including on the basis of the "invited
error" doctrine.
3
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on the credibility of John Berryhill alone, 4 but on a great deal of confirming evidence. 5 Based on
the very language of Exhibit

1, a "loan" that "will be transitioned" is not a simple loan at all.

Further, the parties were acting as partners in the activities of the restaurant move downtown,
they were jointly signing guarantees of leases and procuring expansion space for both Polo Cove
and the restaurant (Tr., Vol I, p. 885, L. 102; p. 626, L. 12- p. 628, L. 25). The funds at issue
were placed on the books of Berryhill & Company in a "holding pattern," as accountant Amy
Dempsey testified, while the parties attempted to finalize their actual agreement as to the "buyin" (Tr., Vol. I, p. 796, L.1 - P. 797, L. 2). She did not consider the funds to be either a loan or
equity, because the parties, including Mosell, would never clarify the nature of the funds to her
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 795, LI. 3-20).
The Supreme Court noted that, as they were instructed, the jury could reasonably have
found from the evidence that the term "loan" had a "special meaning," according to the parties'
intent. John Berryhill testified that he "understood Glenn to say that it was not a loan, but we had
to call it something, so we could put it on the books and just park it so it would have - it
wouldn't have to move until we signed the documents, and put in on a specific tax year. It could

Plaintiff claims that John Berryhill was "not credible," based on this Court's
admonition to him to answer questions more directly. Defendant submits that it is Glenn Mosell
who suffered from more significant credibility problems, claiming that the parties always
intended a loan, despite his own references to "investment" and "divestment." Moreover, Mr.
Mosell' s credibility issues would only compound at any retrial, due to his recent felony
conviction for tax evasion. See, USA v. Mosel!, Case No. 1:l 1-cr-00001-BLW-l.
4

Plaintiff ignores the testimony of Kim Gourley and Amy Dempsey, who never
understood the funds to constitute a loan. This corroborates John Berryhill's testimony on the
intent of both parties.
5
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sit there" (Tr., Vol. I, p. 788, L. 16). As the Supreme Court stated, "[t]hat special meaning was
that it was just a label for tax purposes." 297 P.3d. at 239.
Even Mosell stated that the categorization of the funds as a "loan" was simply an "interim
substitute." Rather than initially making demand on Berryhill & Company for repayment of any
"loan" amount, Mosell testified that he approached Mr. Berryhill in the summer of 2008 and
suggested a deal where Mosell would own fewer shares and get some cash back (Tr., Vol. I, p.
324, LL 10-12). He also referred to his "investment/divestment in Berryhill and the lease" (Tr.,
Vol. I, p. 414, LI. 10-13) and "my capital contributions" (Tr. Vol. I., p. 416, LL 4-6). The
obvious inference from all of this evidence is that the parties were structuring a "buy-in," not
contemplating a lender-borrower relationship.
Accordingly, the jury's finding of no breach of contract was not contrary to the clear
weight of the evidence.

3.

This Court cannot conclude that there is a probability that a new trial would
produce a different outcome.

In a telling error, Plaintiff claims that during oral argument in front of the Idaho Supreme
Court, Plaintiff's counsel
asked Justice Eismann what reasonable person would simply give someone
$405,000.00 to build a restaurant and expect compensation only if a speculative
venture that had not even broke [sic] ground came to fruition in the distant future?
Judge Eismann did not respond. Obviously, there was no reasonable response,
other than a concession that no sensible person would have done such a thing.
(Plaintiff's Memorandum: 16). The actual exchange was quite different: 6

6

See, Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Chris Pierce, filed concurrently.
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Mr. Clark:

Well, the fact that I have a problem with is Mr. Berryhill
gets $405,000.00 of Mosell's money, and Masell does not
get anything. Who in the world would enter into that type
of agreement?

Justice Eismann:

Some people are speculators, and they are trying to develop some
property, and then when the economy goes down, stop putting in
the money. But, by the same token, why would Mr. Berryhill
move downtown and incur increased expenses that he has to pay
and that type of thing?

Mr. Clark:

Well, because he wanted to go back downtown and be flashy
character from day one ...

Justice Eismann:

That's your client's version, and his version is a little different.

Mr. Clark:

Well, your Honor, the bottom line is I believe the overwhelming
evidence, the clear weight of the evidence established, that nobody
would just give another party just $405,000.00, and then all the
checks are marked loan.

Justice Eismann:

You could also say nobody would make unsecured loans of
$405,000.00 to somebody that does not have the ability to repay
him.

Clearly, the above exchange is quite different that the fictitious one portrayed in
Plaintiffs Memorandum. It is also different in a significant way, because Justice Eismann
identifies one of the key reasons why the jury verdict is not against the clear weight of the
evidence and a new trial would produce no different result. The unavoidable fact is that Plaintiff
was a developer involved in a very speculative development. He was an economics major and
ultimately obtained his Series 6 license, working as an investment broker (Tr., Vol. I, p. 328, L.
1). Despite his extensive real estate and financial experience, he never presented Mr. Berryhill
with a note or any other documents relating to any purported "loan" (Tr., Vol. I, p. 593, L. 21).
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For his part, Mr. Berryhill testified that he had no legal or accounting training (Tr., Vol. I, p. 585,
L. 9-13 ). As C.P .A. Amy Dempsey testified, she expected Mo sell to characterize the funds for

her, since they constituted his funds, but he failed to do so. None of these key facts are going to
change at a subsequent trial.
Finally, Plaintiff attempts to argue that at a new trial the jury "will be instructed there was
an express contract, so a different verdict is undeniable" (Plaintiffs Memorandum: 19). Again,
Plaintiff assumes that the jury found "no contract," rather than "no breach," an assumption that
the Idaho Supreme Court found unwarranted based on the wording of the special verdict. Even if
Judge Williamson had granted summary judgment that Exhibit 1 represented an express contract,
as the Idaho Supreme Court found she did not, "because Masell Equities did not object to the
jury instructions, it could not even be granted a new trial based upon an alleged error in them."
297 P.3d at 240, citing, Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Assoc., LLP, 148 Idaho
479,491,224 P.3d 1068, 1080 (2009). Accordingly, this Court is divested of the authority to
order a new trial based on its view that Exhibit 1 constituted an express contract, based on
Plaintiffs failure to preserve the issue. 7
Plaintiff ends its discussion with a claim that a "terrible injustice" would occur if the jury
verdict stands. What Plaintiff ignores is that the great majority of the funds at issue went into
tenant improvements not originally anticipated by the parties, not in Defendant's bank account.

Plaintiff argues that the Supreme Court would not have remanded had it not
thought there was a basis upon which this Court could grant a new trial motion. This is
erroneous. The findings to support a new trial were simply not in the record before them, since
this Court considered that its decision on JNOV rendered Plaintiffs motion for new trial moot.
7
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The jury considered all of these arguments and the evidence and obviously found that, because
no loan was intended by the parties, Berryhill & Company was not liable for repayment of the
funds as a loan. As the record summarized above demonstrates, this conclusion was not contrary
to the ''clear weight" of the evidence.

CONCLUSION
This Court was concerned that it should have instructed the jury that Exhibit 1 was a
contract. As the Idaho Supreme Court has made clear, that concern was misplaced. All of the
other issues that the Court anticipated would be decided by a jury in a subsequent trial principally "what does it mean?" - have already been decided and are not contrary to the clear
weight of the evidence, even if that evidence was conflicting. This Court simply cannot make the
detailed, particularized findings necessary to find otherwise, and cannot find that a second trial
would as a probability result in a different outcome. Accordingly, Defendant respectfully
requests that

u~

DATED this _J_ day of June, 2013.

Attorney for Defendant
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I am a legal assistant with the law firm of Thomas, Williams & Park, LLP.

2.

On May 31, 2013, I obtained a copy of a CD from Idaho Supreme Court Clerk's

Office that contains oral argument heard on January I 4, 2013, in the case of Mosell Equities, LLC
v.

Berryhill & Company, Supreme Court Case No. 38338-2010.
3.

Exhibit A attached hereto is a true and correct copy of an excerpt I prepared from that

oral argument.
DATED this "-/ day of June. 2013.

Chris Pierce

Subscribed and sworn to before me this~ day of June, 2013.

Resi ing at Boise, Idaho
My Commission Expires:
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Idaho Supreme Court
Oral Argument January 14, 2013

Mosel/ Equities v. Berryhill & Co.
Supreme Court #38338-2010

Eric Clark, Esq.:
Daniel E. Williams, Esq.:

Appearing on behalf of Mosell Equities
Appearing on behalf of Berryhill & Co.

EXCERPT FROM ORAL ARGUMENT:
Mr. Clark: Well I think this is memorialized in Mr. Gourley's documents and

Ms. Meyers' documents as they were being drafted as they guys proceeded through 2007 and
2008. They were trying to put something together. And for example, when I asked Mr.
Berryhill what was missing out of the Gourley documents, he said well I really don't know.
Justice Eismann:

He said he is not an attorney. He doesn't know what needs

to be in them.
Mr. Clark: Well ....
Justice Eismann: But then Mr. Mosell said yeah I referred to him as my partner,

but I didn't mean "partner" "partner." I just meant friend or somebody I am working with.
Mr. Clark: Well and lay people tend to use those legal ease words. We know

they that they have a meaning well beyond what the normal people do, and so I hear people hear
say "partner" all the time and it makes me cringe a little bit but they don't have a legal
relationship in writing. They obviously want ....
Justice Eismann: They don't have to have a legal relationship to have written

partnership agreement.
Mr. Clark: Well, but when parties are looking at or calling themselves partners

but are seeking legal advice as to what to put into a partnership agreement or a business entity,
doesn't that show that the intent is that they don't have a valid enforceable agreement at the time
regardless of how they referred to each other?
Justice Eismann: Well could be or could be that they orally formed a

partnership and then later wanted to get it more set forth in writing as to what they were agreeing
to as to the specifics.
Mr. Clark: Well, go to Exhibit 1 then, under those circumstances, there would

be no reason to refer to it as anything as a loan ....
Oral Argument, P. I
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Justice Eismann: Unless you agreed with Mr. Berryhill's testimony that Mr.

Mosell said we have to call it something, so let's just call it a loan for now.
Mr. Clark: Well, and I asked Mr. Berryhill what was it if it wasn't a loan, and

he could not tell me. So ....
Justice Eismann: It could be an investment in this nebulous development.
Mr. Clark: Well, he never testified to that. Although, that is what Mr. Williams

represented in his letter in April 09. Well, it is not a loan. It is not a buy-in. You are not buying
into anything. This was a speculation in a Polo Cove, which none of that $405,000.00 ever went
into Polo Cove. It went right in ...
Justice Eismann: Depends on what the agreement was. If the agreement was we

are going to move the restaurant downtown as part as developing Polo Cove, so that we have a
place to wine and dine possible investors, and make it look ... then moving the restaurant
downtown would be part of the development.
Mr. Clark: Well, I am not disagreeing with that. But I am saying, we got a

relationship here where one party is saying this is a loan and I want you to tell me it's a loan and
so write down its a loan, and then the _ _ receives 9 checks totaling almost $400,000.00,
marked "loan." And what does Berryhill do with those? He doesn't give Mr. Mosell equity in
the company. He puts in a debt account in his ....
Justice Eismann: There was even a dispute as to what company was going to be

equity in. I mean in this respect. Whether Mr. Mosell was just going to buy a 50% interest in
existing Berryhill & Co. or whether Berryhill & Co. was going to be the entity through which the
development occurred.
Mr. Clark: Right. I agree and you are looking at Mr. Worley's documents

which have a separate entity and Ms. Meyers' documents as Berryhill & Co.'s buying 50% of
Berryhill & Co. There is ...
Justice Eismann: But again, the question is whether this transaction is simply it

going to buy half of Berryhill & Co. or is it going to be what Berryhill & Co. currently is, or are
you going to buy of half of the corporation that is going to be used to develop the development
on Sunny Slope?
Mr. Clark: Well, we would know that but we don't have any signed documents,

Justice Eismann, and that therein lies the problem. Now ....
Oral Argument, P. 2
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Justice Eismann: So maybe the jury said there is no contract. Or that it may

have said it wasn't breached. We don't know.
Mr. Clark: Well, but then getting back to the facts and the plain meaning of the
documents and what the parties did, um ... let me ... the Mountain View Landowners case ... "the
conduct of the parties to a contract and their practical interpretation of it is an important fact
when there is a dispute over its meaning." Well, what do we have Mr. Berryhill doing? He is
accepting these checks as loans. He is using them to build out the restaurant, which is what the
parties were trying to do. He's accounting for those funds as a debt to his company, and there is
no signed buy-in. The buy-in never occurred. It will never occur. So what we have looking at
the facts of this case ....
Justice Eismann: You could also look at those facts and say, if this was really a

loan, there would have been some sort of agreement on the terms and repayment. If it was really
buying half of existing Berryhill & Co., then you wouldn't get the $400 and some thousand,
which was apparently more than what half value of Berryhill & Co. would be without also
getting a contract when you parted with the money. I mean there is different ways the jury could
look at the facts in this case.
Mr. Clark: Well, the fact that I have a problem with is Mr. Berryhill gets
$405,000.00 of Mosell's money, and Mosell does not get anything. Who in the world would
entered into that type of agreement?
Justice Eismann: Some people are speculators, and they are trying to develop

some property, and then when the economy goes down, stop putting in the money. But, by the
same token, why would Mr. Berryhill move downtown and incur increased rental expenses that
he has to pay and that type of thing?
Mr. Clark: Well, because he wanted to go back downtown and be flashy
character from day one ...
Justice Eismann: That's your client's version, and his version is a little

different.
Mr. Clark: Well, your Honor, the bottom line is I believe the overwhelming
evidence, the clear weight of the evidence established, that nobody would just give another party
just $405,000.00, and then all the checks are marked loan.
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Justice Eismann: You could also say nobody would make unsecured loans of
$405,000.00 to somebody that does not have the ability to repay him.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited
Liability Company,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC. an Idaho
Corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL Ill and
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as
husband and wife,

Case No. CV OC 0909974

PLAINTIFF'S REPLY
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL FOLLOWING
APPEAL AND REMAND

Judge Dennis Goff

Defendants.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, and by and through counsel, hereby provides its reply brief
in support of its Motion for New Trial Following Remand.
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REPLY ARGUMENT

Berryhill can argue until he is blue in the face that there is conflicting evidence in this
case. That is a given. However, Mosell is entitled to a new trial as the verdict was against the

clear weight of the evidence.
Berryhill concludes his "Statement of Fact" section by stating, "Based on the evidence, as
well as that described above, the jury rightfully concluded the parties did not intend a loan."
Berryhill Memorandum, p. 22. 1 (Emphasis added) However, once again, as he neglected to do
at trial, Berryhill fails to identify if the parties did not intend a loan pending finalization of the
buy-in documents, then just what did the parties intend? Even Berryhill conceded he did not
believe Mosell intended to just give Berryhill $405,000.00. If not a loan, then just what were
those funds, Mr. Berryhill?
Tr. Vol. I, p. 482 [by Mr. Clark-Berryhill Testifying]
4 Q. Did you tell Mr. Berry - or Mr. Mosell that
5 if there's no transition to the buy-in, that you got to
6 keep the money that he had given you?
7 A. No.
Berryhill also misstates the verdict form, which asked the jury to decide whether there
was an "express contract." Berryhill contended at trial that there was no loan, but Mosell
Equities was "buying into my business." In other words, Berryhill concedes there was a contract
for Mosell Equities to purchase stock in Berryhill & CO., but claims it was not a "simple loan
contract," as Masell Equities argued. The jury was not asked to determine whether or not it
believed Mosell Equities, it was asked whether an express contract existed. While Mosell
Equities contends the clear weight of the evidence establishes the parties agreed the funds would

1 By

local rule, Berryhill was only entitled to file a 25 page brief.
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remain a loan pending finalization of the buy-in terms, a finding there was no contract was
against any of the evidence.
A. THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THERE WAS A LOAN
CONTRACT
At the JNOV motion hearing, conducted a few weeks after the trial and while the trial
testimony was fresh in the Court's memory, and after reviewing the evidence, the Court stated
that it had been "shocked" only twice by verdicts in its lengthy career on the bench. One case
involved a claim for medical malpractice, which the Court alluded to in its opinion and the other
was in this case.
JNOV Tr. p. 87.
14. Now, I don't remember if it was 9 to 12 or
15. if it was 12, but all I know is I was totally shocked.
16. And that's how I was totally shocked here, because what
17. do I have?
In its oral ruling the Court stated why it was shocked; because the clear weight of the
evidence established the agreement involved a loan that may be transitioned into Glenn's buy-in,
if and when the parties agreed to the terms. The Court reasoned the best evidence to support this
conclusion was the parties own actions, especially Berryhill's.
JNOV Tr. p. 18
14. Regarding that ambiguity, the plaintiffs
15. assert, number one, it's not ambiguous. A loan's, a
16. loan's, a loan. I think it was a duck's, a duck's, a
17. duck was his argument exactly. And secondly, even if you
18. didn't think a loan, then you need to see -- because what
19. people say, their actions are better -- are stronger than
20. their words.
21. And so, what were -- was Berryhill's actions,
22. what was Mosell's actions? And they -- their actions all
23. treated it as a loan, to be -- and Judge Williamson talks
24. about this to be transitioned into the buy-in of
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
FOLLOWING APPEAL AND REMAND - 3

000080

25. Berryhill and Company.
JNOV Tr. p. 19
1. When I read it -- and I think I even told
2. Counsel this at the beginning of the trial, why are we
3. here? I don't understand why we're here. It seems
4. pretty clear to me. It's a contract. I'm giving you
5. this money for a buy-in to Berryhill.
Later in its opinion, the Court specified just what evidence it relied on when concluding
the verdict was not justified.
Jl\J"OV Tr. p. 91
22. So, when I analyze this, and based really
23. upon Counsels' arguments today, it seemed to me, in the
24. trial and during the arguments today, that Berryhill
25. wants to only take one side or one edge of the sword. If
Jl'l"OV Tr. p. 92
1. you call something a loan in your own handwriting, and
2. you put in your own -- and instruct your own staff to
3. insert it, whether by you're a taxpayer, or for tax
4. purposes, or for whatever, as a loan, then how can you
5. not take the other side of the -- the deal that it is a
6. loan? And that has bothered me from day one.
The Court is correct, the clear weight of the evidence established Berryhill understood the
funds were a loan because he used that term in Exhibit 1 and then thereafter treated Mosell
Equities' funds as a loan in his accounting records. Berryhill's own bookkeeper and manager,
Joy Luedke, testimony Berryhill ignores in his memorandum, confirmed Berryhill's
understanding the funds were a loan. Nothing in Berryhill's brief establishes the Court was
incorrect in its conclusion.
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B. THE MEIER DOCUMENTS ACCURATELY REFLECTED THE PARTIES AGREEMENT
Berryhill also ignores the clear language of the Victoria Meier documents in his brief and
instead refers the Court to the testimony of Kim Gourley. While, Mr. Gourley's documents
reference an all "cash" buy in, the meeting with Gourley took place before Mosell Equities
delivered any funds to Berryhill, so logically there would not be any "loan" language in those
documents. When Gourley was involved the deal was cash for stock as evidenced in Exhibit 34.
Consequently, Gourley's testimony should carry little weight.
Moreover, contrast Exhibit 34 with the Meier documents (Exhibit 35) as set forth in
Mosell Equities' initial brief. It is significant that Exhibit 35 was drafted after Mosell had
already delivered $405,000.00 to Berryhill based on Berryhill's promise in Exhibit 1 he was
acknowledging those funds as a loan pending consummation of the buy in, when and if that
occurred. As the Court will recall at trial when Berryhill was asked repeatedly about what he
would change in the Meier documents; he did not testify he believed the "loan" language clearly
written in those documents was in any manner incorrect. Tr. Vol. I, p. 452, 1. 18 top. 456, L. 14.
C. CPA DEMPSEY WAS NOT CREDIBLE
Berryhill also cites to the testimony of Accountant Dempsey, who remains Berryhill's
accountant, and who claims she did not know how to "classify" the funds from Mosell Equities.
However, her testimony has little weight if any as it was directly contradicted in her own e-mail
to Berryhill (Exhibit 37), where she states. "If you choose to continue to set it up in 2007 then
Glenn would receive a K-1 from Berryhill, if you chose to set the buy-in in 2008 then we would
just leave the monies Glenn donated in 2007 on the books as a loan and then reclass the loan
amounts that are associated with the buy-in to his capital account in 2008." If Dempsey did not
understand Mosell Equities' funds were a loan, then why would she repeatedly refer to those
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
FOLLOWING APPEAL AND REMAND - 5
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funds as a "loan" in her March 5, 2008 e-mail to Berryhill? In light of the contents of this
document, Dempsey's testimony was simply not credible. Moreover, there was no proof that
Berryhill ever responded to this e-mail and asserted Dempsey's reference to Mosell Equities'
funds as loans was inaccurate.
D. MOSELL EQUITIES FUNDS WERE AN "INTERIM SUBSTITUTE"
Berryhill once again argues Glenn's statement the funds he provided to Berryhill were an
"interim substitute" somehow establish Glenn was admitting the funds were not a loan.
However, the reality as Glenn testified at trial, the "loaned" funds were an "interim substitute"
for cash for the buy in. If the parties agreed to the terms of the buy-in, then the loaned funds
would substitute as cash for the buy-in, just as is stated in the Meier documents.
E. POLO COVE IS IRRELEVANT
After hearing the evidence at trial, the Court concluded; "Well Polo Cove is really
nothing. It was a dream in the first place, and investment dream." JNOV Tr. p. 18, LL 7-9.
However, Berryhill wastes the majority of his Statement of Facts section referencing testimony
related to Polo Cove.
The Court was accurate in its assessment of Berryhill's character; that Berryhill wants the
benefit and ignores any responsibility or downside, ("Berryhill wants to only take one side or one
edge of the sword") and Berryhill's claim he was an actual "partner" in the Polo Cove project
exemplifies the Court's accurate assessment. Berryhill only wants to take one side of the sword;
he claims he was a partner, but then has not paid a dime of any outstanding debt related to the
failed Polo Cove project. Typical Berryhill!
Moreover, at trial, Berryhill claimed he was impoverished because he was unable to use
the "Expansion/Polo Cove showroom" space, which Berryhill claimed Mosell forced Berryhill to
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lease. However, within a few short months following the trial, Berryhill opened two new
ventures in this space; the "Plan B" lounge, and Berryhill's "Bacon" restaurant.
(http://johnberryhillrestaurants.com) Additionally, Berryhill offered his lease for the downtown
space as Defendants' Exhibit G at trial. The lease is for a 5-year term and was dated April 12,
2007. According to the lease, it terminated on April 12, 2012. Nonetheless, Berryhill continues
to operate his Berryhill & CO. restaurant, two new ventures, and his catering business, all from
the downtown location. If Berryhill was losing money, as he testified at trial, then why would he
stay in the downtown location and renew the lease?
F. A NEW TRIAL WOULD PROVIDE A DIFFERENT RESULT
The clear weight of the evidence established the parties intended the funds to be a loan
pending the buy-in. At the new trial, if Berryhill survives a motion for summary judgment, the
Jury will be instructed that a contract existed as a matter of law. The only remaining issue is
whether Berryhill breached this express contract. Berryhill resolves that issue by judicial
admission in his Appellant's Brief.
The jury quite simply found that, in determining the parties' intent, there was no
simple loan transaction intended, which was clearly within their providence to do.
If they had found a loan was intended, they would doubtless have found a
breach in answer to Question No. 1 on the Special Verdict. (R., Vol. I, p. 1026,
LL 20-23) and damages in some amount in answer to Question No. 2.
Appellant's Brief, p. 30. (Emphasis added)
The reality, while Mosell Equities is entitled to a new trial and a different outcome is
probable, it is unlikely there will ever be a new trial. As there was an express contract as a
matter oflaw, and Berryhill has admitted a breach, the case will be resolved in Mosell Equities'
favor at summary judgment.
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G. BERRYHILL ADMITTED THERE WAS AN EXPRESS CONTRACT
Even for the sake of argument, and despite the overwhelming evidence the parties
intended Mosell Equities' funds were a loan pending a buy-in, the jury concluded there was no
"simple loan contract," that was not the question they were asked to decide.
Question No. 1: Was there an express contract between Plaintiff Mosell
Equities, LLC, and Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc. which was breached?
Berryhill admitted there was a contract whereby Mosell Equities was purchasing part of
Berryhill & CO. Berryhill testified that he understood that Mosell was paying money to
Berryhill & Company, in consideration for a 50% ownership interest in Berryhill & Company.
Trial Tr., p. 482 [by Mr. Clark- Berryhill testifying]
24 Q. Okay. Let me ask you then, what those were
25 funds, in your mind?
p.483
1 He was buying into my business.
Berryhill also confirmed his understanding while testifying in the Broadway Park Case.
The "buy-in" terms identified and confirmed in the Meier documents were consistent with
Berryhill's testimony in the Broadway Park case that Mosell Equities had already paid in the

required funds and all that was left was to sign the appropriate documents. Tr. Vol. I, p. 445,
L. 4 top. 448, L. 13.

It is undisputed that Mosell substantially performed and paid the requisite funds for the
buy in. Even if against the clear weight of the evidence the jury concluded there was no loan, the
only other evidence presented at trial was Berryhill's admission there was a contract for the
purchase of stock in Berryhill & CO. Either there was a loan agreement that would act as
consideration for the ultimate buy-in, which is supported by the clear weight of the evidence, or
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there was a straight stock purchase contract as Berryhill claimed. Consequently, any verdict that
there was no "express contract" ignores the evidence. There simply was no evidence to support
the verdict there was no "express contract," even if the jury disregarded the clear weight of the
evidence the parties intended a loan.
It is also undisputed that Berryhill refused to tender the promised stock in Berryhill &

CO. Whether the express contract was for a loan or for a straight buy-in, the clear weight of the
evidence established Berryhill has breached either way.
H. MOSELL EQUITIES IS ENTITLED TO RESCISSION
On remand, based on Berryhill's testimony at trial, Mosell Equities would be entitled to
rescind the contract as although Mosell Equities has substantially performed and provided the
funds necessary for the buy-in, Berryhill refused to tender the promised stock, despite his
testimony at trial that the funds Mosell Equities had paid for the purpose of the buy-in.
P. 482 [by Mr. Clark- Berryhill testifying]
24 Q. Okay. Let me ask you then, what those were
25 funds, in your mind?
P.483
1 He was buying into my business.
While the Supreme Court suggests Mosell Equities could have just been paying expenses
for Polo Cove, even Berryhill himself concedes that was not true. Mosell Equities was "buying"
stock in Berryhill & CO., Inc., and Mosell had completed the buy-by paying the requisite funds,
as Berryhill testified in the Broadway Park case. Moreover, Berryhill's financial records
introduced at trial established Berryhill & CO., not Mosell Equities, deducted the expenses for
the Restaurant and accompanying space.
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Mosell Equities was not making "unsecured loans" as Justice Eisemann suggests; Mosell
Equities was making loans based on the promised security of stock in Berryhill & Company,

Inc., which Berryhill refused to tender after Mosell paid Berryhill $405,000.00.
CONCLUSION
Rule 59(a)(6), IRCP, provides a mechanism for the Court to intercede and grant a new
trial when the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence. Obviously, when a Court is
"shocked" by the verdict, after having heard the testimony and having evaluated the credibility
of the witnesses, a new trial is warranted. Whether you believed Mosell Equities' contention the
funds were a loan pending the buy-in or Berryhill's claim the contract was a straight stock
purchase, there was undeniably an express contract. A verdict finding no express contract was
against the weight of any of the evidence.
Moreover, a verdict finding there was no breach of either contract was against the clear
weight of the evidence. Either the funds were a loan, which Berryhill refused to acknowledge or
repay, or the funds were consideration for purchase of stock in Berryhill & CO., which Berryhill
refused to deliver. Again, no question a verdict that no breach occurred is against the clear
weight of the evidence.
Mosell Equities contends the Court was right on in its assessment of the evidence, and
particularly in its finding that Berryhill was not credible. Accordingly, it would be a travesty and
offend justice to let this verdict stand. Mosell Equities is entitled to a new trial and it
respectfully requests the Court grant this motion.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17th day of June, 2013.
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L_.-Eric R. Clark
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COU1\rTY OF ADA

MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited
Liability Company,
Case No. CV-OC-2009-09974

Plaintiff
vs.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an Idaho
Corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as
husband and wife,
Defendants.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case arises from a failed business deal between Plaintiff Mosell Equities. LLC
(hereinafter "Mosell Equities") and Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc. (hereinafter
"Berryhill & Company"). Mosell Equities filed its initial Complaint on May 28, 2009 and its
Amended Complaint on September 14, 2009. The Amended Complaint alleged six causes of
action against Berryhill & Company for: (l) Count I (breach of contract); (2) Count 11 (breach
of an implied-in-fact contract); (3) Count III (quasi-contract/unjust enrichment); (4) Count IV
(conversion); (5) Count V (fraud in the inducement); and (6) Count VI (piercing the corporate
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veil). 1 Berryhill & Company answered the Amended Complaint and filed its own
counterclaim alleging a single count for fraud in the inducement on December 2L 2009.~ Each
of the alleged claims, except for piercing the corporate veil, was tried before a jury in
September 2010. The jury returned a verdict denying affirmative relief on Counts I, 11. IIL and
V of the Amended Complaint and the single count for fraud in the inducement alleged in the
counterclaim. The jury granted Mosell Equities relief on its conversion claim, a\\ arding

$2.016.85.
Shortly thereafter, Mosell Equities moved this Court for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict or, in the alternative. a new trial. 3 In a hearing on October 7, 2010. the Court issued an
oral ruling granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict on Count I of the Amended
Complaint for breach of contract, but otherwise denied the motion. Because the Court granted
judgment notwithstanding the verdict in part, the Court concluded the motion for a ne\\ trial
was moot and did not make an oral ruling granting or denying that motion. Berryhill &
Company appealed the grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict on Count I and Mosell
Equities cross-appealed. 4 The Idaho Supreme Court took the appeal and issued a Remittitur
reversing this Court's grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict on Count I and
remanding the case to this Court with instructions to determine whether to grant Mosell
Equities a new trial on Count 1. 5

See generally Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, filed 9/14/2009.
See generally Answer, Counterclaim and Demand for Jury Trial, filed 12/21/2009.
3 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the verdict, or in the Alternative,
Motion for New Trial, filed 9/21 /20 I 0.
~Notice of Appeal, filed 12/6/2010; Notice ofCross-Appeal, filed 12/17/2010.
' Remittitur, filed 3/28/2013.
1

2
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On May 3, 2013, Mosell Equities moved this Court for a new trial on Count 1. 6
Berryhill & Company opposed the motion.~ Mosel! Equities replied. 8 This matter came before
the Court for oral argument on July 11, 2013. During oral argument, the Court orally granted
the motion for a new trial. The Court indicated that it would issue this written ruling to clarify
its analysis and conclusions. In issuing its oral and written rulings, the Court considered the
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial Following Appeal and Remand;
the Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial Following Appeal and
Remand; Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial
following Appeal and Remand: and the at1idavit of Chris Pierce.
Finally, the Court notes the factual background of this case is extensive. This Court
has already set forth substantial factual background in an April 30, 2010 summary judgment
<lecision, 9 in its October 7. 2010 oral ruling on the motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, and in its July 11. 2013 oral ruling on the motion for a new trial. The Court does not
reiterate all of that factual background here. but instead sets forth only those facts which have
been submitted for purposes of determining whether Mosell Equities is entitled to a new trial.
LEGAL STANDARD

''Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) authorizes an aggrieved party to make a motion
for a new trial on one of several specified grounds." Kuhn v. Coldwell Banker Landmark. Inc ..
150 Idaho 240, 247, 245 P.3d 992, 999 (2010). One such ground is set forth in Rule 59(a)(6).

6

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial Following Appeal and Remand, filed 5/3/2013.
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial Following Appeal and Remand, filed 6/4/2013.
8 Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial Following Appeal and Remand,
6/17/2013.
7
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which provides "[a] new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of
the issues in an action for any of the following reasons: Insufficiency of the evidence to justify
the verdict or other decision, or that it is against the law." "Any motion based on [Rule
59(a)(6)] ... must set forth the factual grounds therefor with particularity." I.R.C.P. 59(a)(7).
To determine whether to grant a new trial under Rule 59(a)(6), a trial court is required
to apply a two prong test:
The first prong directs the trial judge to consider whether the verdict was
against the weight of the evidence and if the ends of justice would be served by
vacating the verdict. The second prong . . . directs the trial court to consider
whether a different result would follow in a retrial. The second prong requires
more than a mere possibility; there must be a probability that a different result
would be obtained in a new trial.

Warren v. Sharp, 139 Idaho 599, 603, 83 P.3d 773, 777 (2003). The Idaho Supreme Court
also explained:
The judge does not have unlimited authority to disturb the verdict of a jury.
Respect for the function of the jury prevents the granting of a new trial except
in unusual circumstances. The trial judge is not required to view the evidence
in a light most favorable to the verdict-winner. Although the mere fact that the
evidence is in conflict is not enough to set aside the verdict and grant a new
trial, when a motion for a new trial is based on the ground that the verdict is
against the weight of the evidence, the judge is free to weigh the conflicting
evidence for himself.

Id. See also Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423, 430, 196 P .3d 341, 348 (2008)
(summarizing that "[a] trial judge may grant a new trial on that ground if, after making his or
her own assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and weighing the evidence, the judge
determines that the verdict is not in accord with the clear weight of the evidence").

Memorandum Decision and Order Regarding Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, Motions to Strike. Motion
to Amend Complaint, and Motion to Compel, filed 4/30/2013.

9
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Further, ""[t]he trial court is given broad discretion in this ruling." Karlson v. Harris.
140 Idaho 561, 568, 97 P.3d 428,435 (2004).

Thus, "[t]he trial judge may set aside the

verdict even though there is substantial evidence to support it." Id. "[T]he trial judge must
disclose his reasoning for granting or denying motions for a new trial ... unless those reasons
are obvious from the record itself." Quickv. Crane, 111 Idaho 759. 772. 727P.2d1187. 1200
( 1986). "The grant or denial of a motion for a new trial is reviewed ... under an abuse of
discretion standard." Kuhn, supra.
Motion to Strike
Mosell Equities moves this Court to strike the Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial Following Appeal and Remand because it exceeds the page
limits set forth in the Local Rules of the District Court and Magistrate Division for the Fourth
Judicial District.

10

Specifically, Rule 8 of the Local Rules states such memoranda are not to

exceed twenty-five (25) pages. Defendant's memorandum is thirty-two (32) pages, including
the cover page and the certificate of service. Although Berryhill & Company has not filed a
motion seeking an order allowing the filing of the memorandum over the page limit, the Court
noted at oral argument and reiterates here that Defendant's memorandum was not redundant
or otherwise improper. The Court DENIES the motion to strike.
Summary Judgment
ANALYSIS

In its Remittitur, the Idaho Supreme Court made clear the only issue remaining before
this Court is whether Mosell Equities should be granted a new trial on Count I of its Amended
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Complaint for breach of an express contract. 11 Applying the foregoing legal standard to the
issue before this Court, a new trial is warranted on Count I only if this Court concludes: (I)
the jury verdict that there was no express contract which \Vas breached is not in accord with
the clear weight of the evidence and the ends of justice would be served by vacating the
verdict; and (2) there is a probability that a new jury will conclude there is an express contract
which was breached if this Court orders a new trial. The Court addresses each of these issues
in turn below.

I.

\Vhether the jury verdict that there "as no express contract ,, hich "as
breached is not in accord with the clear weight of the evidence and the
ends of justice would be sened by vacating the Yerdict.

The Idaho Supreme Court correct!:, noted this Court's determination of this i:--:-uc must
he based upon the jury instructions ,vhich

\\Cre

given to the jury. not the instruction:- ,, hich

this Court and the parties believe should have been gi,en to the jury. 1~ The Court has
t\:,ie\\Cd all of the jury instructions in this case in making the follo,,ing determinations. !he
jury instructions included the Special Verdict form which was utilized by the jury in making
its determinations at the end of the jury trial. Li Question \lo. 1 of the Spc,.:ial Verdict a-.,h.'-·LI till'
jury: "'\Vas there an express contract betv.cen Plaintiff \loscll Equities. ILC and Defendant
Berryhill & Company, Inc. which ,vas breached'?'' The jury·s answer to (Jucstion \:o. I ,vas
simply '"No." l\o jury instruction informed the jury that there was a contract het,,een the

10 Motion to Strike Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial and Remand.
filed 6/11/2013.
11 Remittitur, p. 14.
12 ld, pp. 7-8 (citing Bolognese v. Forte, 153 Idaho 857,867 fn. 6,292 P.3d 248,258 fn. 6 (2012) (summarizing
that ''[a] party who fails to properly object to an instruction that misstates the law cannot circumvent Rule 51 (b)
by arguing insufficiency of the evidence, based upon a correct statement of the law" but instead "the sufficiency
of the evidence must be determined based upon the jury instructions given, not upon those that shou Id have been
given'')).
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parties as a matter of law. 14 No jury instruction limited the scope of the contract which the
jury could find (e.g. the jury instructions did not limit the scope of the contract to being a
loan).
The Idaho Supreme Court noted that because Question No. 1 is a compound question.
it is impossible to know whether the jury found that there was no express contract. or whether
the jury found that there was an express contract but it simply was not breached. i:- Because the
jury could have made either finding. the Idaho Supreme Court concluded this Court could not
grant a judgment not\vithstanding the verdict unless the Court concluded reasonable minds
could not have answered both of the questions in the manner the jury did. 16 This same
principle equally applies to this Court's determination of whether to grant a new trial. Thus. to
grant a nc\V trial. this Couti must conclude: ( 1) a verdict that there was no express contract is
against the clear weight of the evidence; (2) a verdict that the contract was not breached is
against the clear weight of the evidence; and (3) the ends of justice would be served by
vacating the verdict. Any other finding would require this Court to decline to grant a new trial.
The Cou1i considers these separate aspects of the compound question contained in Question
No. 1 in turn below.

13

Special Verdict, filed 9/15/2010.
Further, when it granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict, this Court stated that Judge Williamson had
decided at summary judgment that there was a contract between the parties as a matter of law. The Idaho
Supreme Court made clear in its Remittitur that this Court was incorrect in its interpretation of Judge
Williamson's decision and such decision did not grant summary judgment that there was an express contract. See
Remittitur, pp. 9-10.
is Id., p. 8.
16 Id., pp. 8-9.
14
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A.

\Vhether a wnlict that there was no express contract is against tht
clear weight of the evidence.

The Court first notes the Idaho Supreme Court concluded. based up()n the legal
standard applicable to motions for judgment notv,ithstanding the pleadings. the Court erred in
concluding there was insufficient evidence to support the j ur~( s \ erdict on Question No. 1.

1

-

fkcausl· the issue \\as hefon:· the lc!Jho Supreme Court on a judgment not\\ Ilhstanding thl·
verdict. the court \\as required to admit the truth of all of Defendant· s evidence and ever)
legitimate inference that could be drawn from that evidence in the light mnst favorable to
Defendant. 18 As this Court set forth above. that is not the legal standard before this Court
when determining whether to grant a new trial. Instead. this Court is entitled to weigh the
e\idence without vie\,ing the evidence in favor of the vcrdict-\,inner. Sl't aside the verdict.
and grant a new trial even if there is substantial evidence to support the verdict.

Sc"c'

.Johannsen, supra: Karlson, supra.
The remaining jury instructions most pertinent to the Court·s determination regarding
the formation of an express contract are Instruction Nos. 3-9. and 11. Instruction No. 3 sets
forth that Mosell Equities had the burden of proving each of the four elements of a breach of
contract claim, including proving that a contract existed between Mosell Equities and
Berryhill & Company. Instruction No. 4 sets forth the requirements for a valid contract and
the parties therein stipulate to all the requirements for a valid contract, except the parties
dispute whether there was mutual agreement by all the parties to all essential terms of any
alleged contract. Regarding this final requirement, Instruction No. 5 sets forth:

17
18

Id., pp. 7-9.
Id. (citing Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 763, 727 P.2d 1187, 1191 ( 1986)).
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In this case, the defendant alleges that all parties did not agree to all essential
terms of the contract. This requirement is sometimes referred to as the ·meeting
of the minds,' and means that all parties to a contract must have understood
and accepted all of the essential terms of the contract.
There is no contract unless all of the essential terms have been communicated
to all parties, understood by all parties, and accepted by all parties.
Instruction No. 6 explains that a contract may be written or oral. Instruction No. 7 sets forth:
Ordinarily, a contract results when negotiations are complete and all essential
terms have been agreed upon. This is true even though the parties expect to put
their agreement in writing. However, if the parties have agreed not to be bound
until their agreement is reduced to writing. no contract results until this is done.
Instruction No. 8 explains that an express contract may consist of an offer and an acceptance.
and elaborates on those requirements. Instruction No. 9 explains that silence may operate as
acceptance under certain enumerated circumstances. Instruction No. 11 explains that the terms
of the contract are in dispute and sets forth the legal rules the jury was to apply in determining
what was intended by the parties, including that the language of any contract must be given its
ordinary meaning unless the jury found from the evidence that a special meaning was
intended.
Here, Glenn \\TOte a check to Berryhill & Company for $50,000.00 dated June 28.

2007. 19 The check was written out of the account of Mosell Equities. 20 The memo line of the
check says ·'Loan:· In a handwritten note underneath a photocopy of the check. John and
Glenn sign their names below the following statement:
This is a loan from Mosell Equities to cover some misc. downtown expenses
during our bookeeper [sic] transition. It will go into the general check register
+ be used for any billing of payables needed for downtown or Berryhill & Co.

19
20

The check was submitted as evidence to the jury as Exhibit I and will hereafter be referred to as Exhibit I.
Id.
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It will be transitioned into part of Glenn's "buy in'' of Moberry Venture Corp.
Inc.21
Glenn issued nine additional checks to Berryhill & Company, each out of the account of
Mose II Equities, none of which were accompanied by a similar handwritten note signed by the
parties. Instead, the issued checks contained the following relevant information: ( 1) a July 30.
2007 check for $25,000.00 with ''Loan·· written in the memo line; (2) an August 7. 2007
check for $25,000.00 with "Loan - Tl's'" written in the memo line; (3) an August 16. 2007
check for $25,000.00 with "Loan# 4'' written in the memo line; (4) another August 16, 2007
check for $25.000.00 with "Loan# 5" written in the memo line; (5) an October 9, 2007 check
for $60,000.00 with "Kitchen Equip Loan'' written in the memo line; (6) an October 26. 2007
check for $100.000.00 with "Loan" written in the memo line; (7) a December 4, 2007 check
for $25.000.00 with "Loan .. written in the memo line: (8) a December 19, 2007 check for
$50,000.00 with "Loan" written in the memo line; and (9) a June 30, 2008 check for
$20,000.00 with ··Suite 101 Tl's" written in the memo line. 22 Adding all the amounts of all 10
checks yields the sum of $405,000.00 issued to Berryhill & Company.
Mosell Equities contends the handwritten note which both Glenn and John signed
underneath the June 28, 2007 check constitutes a legally enforceable contract wherein Mosell
Equities loaned Berryhill & Company $50,000.00 which loan was either to be transitioned
into shareholder equity in "Moberry Venture Corp. Inc." or paid back in the event the
transition never took place. 23 Mosell Equities also contends that the subsequent checks were

21

Id.

These checks were submitted as evidence to the jury as Exhibits 3 through I I and are hereafter referred to as
Exhibits 3 through 11.
2; Mosell's Memo. in Supp. New Trial, pp. 4-17.
22

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 10

000098

all part of this same loan transaction. 2-t Ben-yhill & Company responds that the evidence docs
not support the argument that the parties contemplated a lender-borrower relationship. but
instead the parties were clearly structuring a ""buy-in." 2" Both parties rely on extrinsic
evidence to support their contention regarding the formation of the purported contract and the
interpretation of the language of the purported contract.
In addition to the foregoing checks and signed note, Moscll Equities relies on evidence
submitted to the jury, including the testimony of Joy Luedtke (hereinafter ··Luedtke .. ) (the
general manager and bookkeeper for Beryhill & Company from October 2007 through
October 2008) and a June 30, 2008 balance sheet of Berryhill & Company submitted to the
jury as Exhibit 53, which shows that the $405,000.00 issued to Berryhill & Company were
accounted for on its financial books as "Long Term Liabilities" to "'Mosell Equities LLC.'' 26
Mo sell Equities also relies on Luedtke' s testimony that she and John considered possible
sources of repayment of the funds issued to Berryhill & Company, and that John newr told
her that the funds were not a loan. 27 Mosell Equities cites to Exhibit 37, which contains an email by Amy Dempsey (hereinafter ""Dempsey''), the CPA of Berryhill & Company. \\hich
oddly refers to the funds as "donated in 2007 [and] on the books as a loan." 28 Glenn·s own
testimony is that he understood the funds to be loans that "would either be repaid to me. as a
loan would be. or that loan \vould be comerted to equity or stock in Berryhill & Company.-- 2'1

2~

Id.

Defendant's Memo. in Opp. New Trial, p. 28.
Mosel l's Memo. in Supp. New Trial, pp. 7-8.
27 Id., p. 8.
28 Id.. pp. 8-9.
29 Id., pp. 9-10.
25

26
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Glenn also testified that the first time he heard John dispute the funds as a loan was in
response to a demand for repayment sent to Mosell Equities in April 2009. 30
Mosell Equities also relies on a series of documents which were never signed but
constitute a course of conduct that evidences the intent of the parties. For example, an attorney
named L. Victoria Meier (hereinafter "Meier") met with Glenn and John in January 2008 and
drafted several corporate documents that identified her understanding of what had transpired
between Glenn and John as of their meeting. 31 These documents, submitted to the jury as
Exhibit 35, include the following: (1) the Berryhill & Company, Inc. Special Meeting of the
Board of Directors and Shareholders, dated effective December 31, 2007; (2) a Stock
Purchase Agreement; and (3) a Satisfaction of Loan. 32 Mosell Equities emphasizes certain
portions of each document as evidencing the intent of the parties that the $405,000.00 issued
to Berryhill & Company constituted a loan.
Specifically, the Berryhill & Company, Inc. Special Meeting document contains the
following relevant excerpts:

WHEREAS, the Company [Berryhill & Company, Inc.] has borrowed
Four Hundred Thousand Dollars from Glenn E. Mosell for the funding of the
relocation of the Company's restaurant to a new location and for the capital
improvements to be made to the restaurant and banquet rooms.
WHEREAS, Glenn E. Mosell desires to acquire an interest in the
Company in exchange for, and as repayment of, the amount lent to the
Company.
RESOLVED, that upon receipt of the Satisfaction of Loan evidencing
that the Company's obligation to Mosell has been paid, the Directors are
hereby authorized to issue two hundred (200) shares of the one dollar ($1) par
value common capital stock of the Company to Mosell.
30

3I
32

Id., p. 10.
Id.
Id., pp. I 1-12.
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The Stock Purchase Agreement contains the following relevant excerpts:
WHEREAS, during the calendar year of 2007, Mosell loaned the
Corporation [Berryhill & Company, Inc.] Four Hundred Thousand Dollars
($400,000) to fund the relocation of the Corporation's restaurant and for capital
improvements needed for the Corporation's Restaurant and banquet rooms (the
"Loan").
WHEREAS, the Corporation desires to issue two hundred (200) shares
of the Corporation's common capital stock to Mosell as repayment of the Loan.
Mosell desires to accept the two hundred (200) shares of the Corporation's
common capital stock as repayment of the Loan and to have the Loan
reclassified on the Corporation's books and records as a capital contribution
from Mosell.
WHEREAS, the Directors of the Corporation and the Shareholder
[John Berryhill] have agreed that it is in the best interest of the Corporation to
authorize and to admit Mosell as a shareholder of the Corporation and to
reclassify the Loan as a capital contribution from Mosell as payment for the
two hundred (200) shares pursuant to the terms and conditions of this
Agreement.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and
agreements contained herein, Corporation, Shareholder, and Mosell agree as
follows:
3. Payment of Subscription Price. Mosell shall pay the Subscription
Price by canceling the Loan and thereafter authorizing the Corporation to
reclassify the Loan on the Corporation's books and records as a capital
contribution from Mosell to the Corporation.

The Satisfaction of Loan contains the following relevant excerpt:
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that GLENN E.
MOSELL, a married man dealing with his sole and separate property. does
hereby certify and declare that the certain Loan in the original amount of Four
Hundred Thousand Dollars ($400,000) made and entered into by
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, an Idaho corporation, as "borrower.. , to
GLENN E. MOSELL, as "lender", is fully paid, satisfied and discharged.
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Mosell Equities argues John had opportunities at trial to testify the "loan" language in these
documents was in some way incorrect, but never did so. 33 Finally, Mosell Equities relies on
John's testimony that John did not believe he got to keep the money if there was no transition
to the aforementioned "buy-in."34
Berryhill & Company acknowledges all of these references to the funds being a '·loan,.
but argue that the parties intended a special meaning for the word "loan." 35 Berryhill &
Company relies extensively on the trial testimony of John. For example, John testified that he
never understood the funds to be a loan. 36 John testified that when he saw the word '·loan··
used on the memo line of the June 28, 2007 check, he asked Glenn why the check was labeled
a loan and Glenn responded that they had to call the funds something. 37 John testified he
understood they had to call the funds something so the funds could be put in the books and for
certain unclear tax purposes. 38 John testified Glenn referred to the term '·loan" as simply an
"interim substitute" while the funds were waiting to be transitioned into the "buy-in. " 39
Berryhill & Company also relies on the testimony of Dempsey, the CPA of Berryhill &
Company. For example, Dempsey testified she did not completely understand the end goals of
Glenn and John or what they were trying to achieve. 40 Dempsey testified there was no clear
definition of what the funds were or what they were for and Glenn was never really clear that

Id.,
Id.,
35 See
16 Id.,
17 Id.
1s Id.
11

3~

p. 14.
p. 17.
generally Defendant's Memo. in Opp. New Trial.
p. 13.

39 Id., p. 14.
~o Id., p. 15.
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the funds were a loan. 41 Dempsey acknowledged the funds were accounted in the books of
Berryhill & Company as long-term liabilities but says term signified the funds were in a
holding pattern until there was legal documentation to define hov.. to treat the funds.-1 2
Berryhill & Company also cites to the testimony of Kimbell Gourley (hereinafter
"Gourley"). an attorney who was hired by Glenn and John. The parties met with Gourley on
March 6. 2007. prior to the issuance of any of the aforementioned checks. to discuss the
proposed formation of a new corporation to be known as MoBerry Corporation. 43 Gourley
understood John and Mosell Equities were to become shareholders of the ne\\ corporation_-1-1
Gourley testified it was never his understanding that the shareholder buy-in of MoBerr~
Corporation transaction was going to take the form of a loan. 45 Gourley testified that
structuring the buy-in as a loan would be inconsistent with a capital contribution into a
·
46
corporat10n.

Finally. Berryhill & Company relies extensively on evidence submitted at trial
regarding the proposed Polo Cove real estate development in Canyon County. ln so relying.
Berryhill & Company attempts to explain that the disputed funds were given to it as only a
part of a greater complex transaction or partnership among the parties that involved using
Berryhill & Company to market and brand the proposed Polo Cove development. The Court
will not reiterate all of the extensive evidence submitted by Berryhill & Company regarding
the Polo Cove development, but the Court has reviewed all of the submitted evidence several

Id., pp. 15-16.
Id., p. 16.
4 ~ Id., p. 12.
44 Id.
45 Id.
41

42
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times m considering this motion. The Court will briefly summanze Defendant's key
ev1"d ence. 47
Berryhill & Company offers evidence that Glenn wanted to utilize the Berryhill &
Company reputation and expertise to support the proposed Polo Cove development. There
was an understanding that there was value or "brand equity" in having Berryhill & Company
involved in the development. Mosell Equities paid John as a consultant to work on the Polo
Cove development. John spent substantial amounts of time on the Polo Cove development. At
the urging of Glenn, John moved his restaurant to downtown Boise and signed a lease for the
new location on April 12, 2007. The new restaurant location was meant to attract investors for
the Polo Cove development and to show the essence of the Polo Cove development. It was
only a couple months later that Glenn issued the first check to Berryhill & Company on June
28, 2007 for $50,000.00 at least in part for the expenses of the new downtown restaurant
location. Just a few months after Berryhill & Company moved to the new downtown location.
Glenn and John expanded the downtown restaurant location to include additional space to
showcase the Polo Cove development. The cost of remodeling the new restaurant location was
$100,048.43 and the cost for the expansion space was $193,801.29. Thus, Berryhill &
Company argues, the bulk of the funds given to Berryhill & Company went toward paying
these ·'tenant improvements." Shortly thereafter, the Polo Cove development was shelved and
Glenn sent John several communications wherein Glenn discussed wanting to talk to John
about his "investment/divestment" in Berryhill & Company and "to go over [his] capital

46

47

Id.
The full statement of facts is contained in Defendant's MeRlo. in Opp. New Trial, pp. 4-22.
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.

contributions with John." Defendant's conclusion is simply that the word '·loan·' had a
"special meaning," which was that it was just a label for tax purposes.
Weighing all the evidence submitted, including the key evidence summarized above.
the Court concludes a verdict that there ,vas no express contract is against the ckar weight of
the evidence. In so doing, the Court reiterates many of its same findings and conclusions set
forth in its October 7, 2010 ruling from the bench granting Mosel! Equities judgment
not\vithstanding the verdict and in its July 1 L 2013 ruling from the bench granting Mosel!
Equities a ne,v trial. Specifically, Exhibit 1 is a signed writing containing the clear.
unambiguous language that the June 28, 2007 $50,000.00 check '·is a loan .. bdwcen iv1osel I
Equities which provided the funds and Berryhill & Company. which accepted the funds. The
funds were provided to pay for the move to downtO\vn and the agreement was written and
signed that it was to be treated as a loan to cover miscellaneous dO\vnto,vn expenses during a
bookkeeper transition. The funds were to go into the general check register and to be used for
any bi! ling of payables needed for the downtovm location or Berry hi 11 & Company. The
language of the signed ,,Titing indicated that this loan ··will be transitioned into part of
Glenn's 'buy in' of Maberry Venture Corp. Inc." The unsigned documents contained in
Exhibit 35 which were drafted by an attorney on behalf of Glenn and John after l:xhibit 1 ,vas
signed evidences the intent of Mosell Equities and Berryhill & Company that the loan he
transitioned into a "buy-in:· The testimony indicating that the loan was an ·'interim substitute"
was that it was an "interim substitute" for the "buy-in." This was the requisite meeting of the
minds. There was no testimony that the loan was an "interim substitute'' for buying branding
or any other exchange.
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All of the exhibits and testimony, taken as a whole, show the clear weight of the
evidence is that there was an express contract that the loan was an "interim substitute" to be
transitioned into a "buy-in" of MoBerry Venture Corp. The Cou11 next considers whether a
verdict that the contract \Vas not breached is against the clear weight of the evidence.

B.

·whether a verdict that the contract was not breached is against the
clear weight of the evidence.

As with the Court's determination above. the Coui1 must begin by considering what
jury instructions were submitted to the jury which specifically regarded the element of breach.
The Court has again reviewed all of the jury instructions. The jury instructions most pertinent
to the Court·s determination regarding the breach of an express contract are Instruction Nos. 3
and 15. Instruction No. 3 sets forth that Mosell Equities had the burden of proving each of the
four elements of a breach of contract claim, including proving that any contract which existed
between Mosell Equities and Berryhill & Company was breached by Berryhill & Company.
Instruction No. 15 instructs the jury that if it found a contract exists between Mosell Equities
and Berryhill & Company, the jury was to determine what a reasonable time would be for the
performance of the contract under the circumstances of this case.

It is undisputed that Mosell Equities paid Berryhill & Company $405,000.00. It is
undisputed thm the proposed buy-in never happened - Berryhill & Company never gave
Mosel! Equities shares in the proposed MoBerry Corporation or the established Berryhill &
Company. The Cow1 notes that although there was no time for performance given in the
contract ... the law implies that performance must occur within a reasonable time." McFurlanJ

v. Joint School Dist. No 365,108 Idaho 519,522.700 P.2d 141,144 (Ct. App. 1985). The
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initial signed writing occurred on or about June 28. 2007. It has been nearly six years to the
day of this initial signed writing without the provided funds being transitioned into a "buy-in ...
Based on the Court's review of all the evidence. more than six years to transition the funds
into a ··buy-in'· is an unreasonable time for performance. Thus, although Mosel] Equities
performed its obligations to Berryhill & Company under the contract by providing the
requisite funds, Berryhill & Company did not completely perform its obi igations v,ithin a
reasonable time by failing to transition the funds into a '·buy-in." Therefore, the clear weight
of the evidence establishes that Berryhill & Company breached the express contract. The·
Court notes that although the evidence offered by Berryhill & Company regarding Pohi Cove
and the value of the branding of Berryhill & Company to Moscll Equities is not sufficient to
cstabl ish the absence of the aforementioned express contract and breach. such evidence may
go to the issue of partial performance and damages if those items are considered rccei, c:d by
Mosel l Equities in exchange for its $405,000.00.
C.

Whether the ends of justice would be served by vacating the
verdict.

Based on the foregoing. the Comi concludes that the ends of justice would be served
bv vacating the verdict because there was an express contract between the parties which was
breached and the parties are entitled to have a reasonable jury try these issues.
II.

\Vhether there is a probability that a nen· jury will conclude there is an
express contract which was breached if this Court orders a new trial.

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the jury on retrial wi II find contrary
to the first jury by finding an express contract that Berryhill & Company breached by failing
to perform within a reasonable period of time. See rvarren. supra (explaining that .. [i]n order
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to find that a different result would occur in a retrial. the district judge must conclude that the
jury on retrial would"' find contrary to the first jury).

III.

\Vhether the Court should deny the motion for a new trial even if all of the
above is true.

Berryhill & Company spent a significant portion of oral argument contending that even
if all of the above is true, the motion for a new trial shoukl still be denied. Specifically.
Berryhill & Company argued Mosell Equities has based its entire case on the express contract
being a simple loan which was breached by Berryhill & Company when it foiled to repay the
loan in cash. Berryhill & Company thus contends that l'v1osell Equities cannot now be granted
a ne,v trial on the theory that the express contract was for a buy-in which was breached by
Berryhill & Company when it failed to follow through with transitioning the funds into a buyin. In so arguing, Berryhill & Company referenced Heitz v. Carroll, 117 Idaho 373. 788 P.:2d

188 ( 1990).
In Heit:::, the Idaho Supreme Court summarized .. [\\]here a plainti1T has chosen to
submit his case upon certain issues or theories, they are bound by choices, and it is error for
the trial court to aJterward grant one party a new trial on the basis that the plaintiff might have
prevailed had it raised a different issue.'· Id. at 378. 788 P.2d at 193. Based on this rule. the
court in Heitz concluded that a trial cow1 erred ··in ruling on a motion f'or a new trial ... [by]
concluding that the special verdict form should have included other legal theories than those
which the pm1ies chose to submit to the jury." Id. Significantly, the court's determination of
what issues were submitted to the jury was based on what issues the jury was asked to
determine in the special verdict form. Id

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 20
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In this case. the relevant portion of the special verdict form submitt..:d to th..: it1n \,as
in ()ucstion No. 1: ··Was there an express contract hctv,ccn Plaintiff \l()s..,;ll l:qt1itics. 1.1.C.
and Dcfond,mt Berryhill & Company, [nc. which \'las brt?achcdT Quc~tion !\o. 1 l',1ntains

th)

language that ltrnits the jury to dctcm1ining \\hcther therL: was an express contract oct\\,:cn Llk'

rx1rtics that \\as a loan. In fact. the word ··Joan"" or any descriptfon of a ··Joan·· \Vas nc\ er
indudcd in any of the questions in the special verdict form or in att: of the instructions

submitte<l to the jury. Although the parti ..~s may now contt:nd that the form and ins11 udi,H1-.
which wen: given to the jury were fla,vcd. this Court is bound In rc\'it'\\ the ju!") ·s ,ct diet in
light of the instructions tht: jury actually received and not the instruction:-. lilL' j,ir) shouid h,n c

n:cciH:<l. See Bolognese. supra. Thus, this Court is "Within its discretion 10 grant a new trial if
the dear weight of the evidence establishes any express contract between the parties \.\ bich
was breached. 111e Court has done so. The issue of the scope of the claim Moscll Equitii,;s
actually stated in its Amended Complaint is not currently before this Court. Therefore. the

contention of Berryhill & Company is without merit.
CONCLUSION

Tilt> Court GRANTS the motion for a new trial and vacates the jur:,. ·s ,crdicL
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Daled this

/2 ~day of August 2013. .
,,,.//~)
/

,

.·

~~-~.a;ff
Senior District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on the __d_1ay of August 2013, I mailed (served) a true and

correct copy of the within instrument to:

ERIC R. CLARK
CLARK & AS SOCIA TES, ATTORNEYS
P.O. BOX 2504
EAGLE, ID 83616
DANIEL E. WILLIAMS
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP
121 N. 9TH STREET, SUITE 300
P.O. BOX 1776
BOISE, IDAHO 83701

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH

B~ctCoUP,L
y

Deputy~=~-
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AUG 2 0 2013
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By MARTHA LYKE
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOlJRTH nJDICIAL DISTRICT OF
TT JEST A TE Of IDAHO, IN AND FOR Tl IE COUNTY OF ADA

MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited
Liability Company,
Plaintiff

Case No. CV-OC-2009-09974

ORD.ER GRANTING
NEW TRIAL

YS.

BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an Idaho
Corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and
AMY BERRYIULL, individually, and as
husband and wife,
Defendants.

Pursuant to the Court's Memorandum Decision filed August 19, 2013, a ne\~- jury trial
is ordered. Furthermore, the parties are ordered to submit, within fourteen (14) days of the
date of this order, their available dates for jury trial.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED.
Dated this

,1f.?:1 _:~"day of August 2013.
/

""'Dennis E. Goff
Senior District Judge

/

,-
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
i hereby certify that on the

d-0 d-day of August 2013, I mailed (served) a true and

correct copy of the within instrument to:

ERIC R. CLARK
CLARK & AS SOCIATES, ATTORNEYS
P.O. BOX 2504
EAGLE, ID 83616
DANIEL E. WILLIAMS
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP
121 N. 9TH STREET, SUITE 300
P.O. BOX 1776
BOISE, IDAHO 83701

CHRISTOPHER D. PJCH
Clerk pf the District Court
By~~
Deputy CleD(
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0

DANIEL E. WILLIAMS (ISB 3920)
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP
121 N. 9 th St., Suite 300
P. 0. Box 1776
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone (208) 345-7800
Fax: (208) 345-7894
danw@thomaswilliamslaw.com

A.,...Ml
_ _ _ _FU..eo_1P.M.

2 ~b

AUG 2 2 2013
CHRISTOPHER 0. RICH. Cleek
ByKATHYllltl.
Depillf

Attorneys for Defendants/Appellant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho limited
liability company,

Case No. CV OC 0909974

Plaintiff/Respondent,
-vsNOTICE OF APPEAL
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an
Idaho corporation, JOHN E.
BERRYHILL III and AMY BERRYHILL,
individually, and as husband and wife,
Defendants/Appellant.

TO:

THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, MOSELL EQUITIES, AND ITS
ATTORNEY OF RECORD, ERIC R. CLARK, AND THE CLERK OF THE
ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
I.

Defendant, Berryhill & Company, Inc., appeals against the above-named Plaintiff,

to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Order Granting New Trial entered on the 20th day of
August, 2013, by the Honorable Dennis Goff, Senior District Judge.
NOTICE OF APPEAL- I
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2.

Appellant hereby appeals as a matter of right to the Idaho Supreme Court from the

above-referenced Order Granting New Trial, which is deemed to include all interlocutory
judgments, orders and decrees as provided under Idaho Appellate Rule l 7( e).
3.

The issue the Appellant intends to assert on appeal is that the court erred in

granting Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial Following Appeal and Remand.
4.

Appellant, Berryhill & Company, Inc., has a right to appeal since the Order

described in paragraph l above is an appealable order as defined in Idaho Appellate Rule
1l(a)(5).
5.

Appellant requests the preparation of the reporter's transcript in hard copy and

electronic format.
6.

Appellant requests a scanned copy of the clerk's record to include the following

documents in addition to those automatically included under Idaho Appellate Rule 28:

7.

(a)

all correspondence directed by the parties to the Court; and

(b)

all correspondence between the parties which the Court received copies of.

I hereby certify that:
(a)

a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter;

(b)

the clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for

preparation of the reporter's transcript of the July l l, 2013 hearing on Plaintiffs Motion
for New Trial Following Appeal and Remand.
(c)

the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's supplemental record has

been paid;
(d)

the appellate filing fee has been paid; and

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2
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(e)

service of this notice has been made upon all parties required to be served

pursuant to Rule 2 ~
DATED this~day of August, 2013

Daniel E. Williams
Attorney for Defendants/Appellant

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3
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CERT~ATE OF SERVICE
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I hereby certify that on this
day of August, 2013, I served a copy of the foregoing
instrument on opposing counsel as indicated below:
Eric R. Clark
Clark & Associates, Attorneys
P. 0. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616

_ _ Via Hand Delivery
Via Facsimile - 939-7136
vVia U.S. Mail

and mailed a copy to the court reporter at:
Penny Tardiff
Ada County Transcript Dept.
Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front St., Room 4171
Boise, ID 83702

Daniel E. Williams

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4
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09/•JS/2013
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FAX
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nANlF:l, K wn ,J .TA MS (TSB 3920)
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LT.P
121 N. 9 th SL, Suite 300
J>. O. Rox 1776
lloise, ID 83701
Telephone (208) 345-7800
Fax: (208) 345-7894
danw(u),thomuswi11inmsh1w.com

N0·--::::---=~---FILED
A.M. 0: OO
P.M._ _ __

SEP O5 2013
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By BRADLEY J. THIES
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendants/AJlpcllant

JN THR DISTRICT COURT OF THE lt'OlJRTH JlHHCIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE 011' IUAIJO, TN ANO FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho limited
linbilily company,

Plaintiff/Rc."pondent,

ll.1£.RRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., un
Idaho corporation, JOHN .1£.
BERRYHILL Ill and AMY BERRYHILL,
individually, and as husband and wife,

Supreme Court Docket No. 41338-2013
Ada County No. CV OC 0909974

AMENDED NOTICE OF APP.1£AL

Uefendants/A1lpcllan t.

TO:

THR ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, MOS.1£LL .I£QlllTIF.S, AND ITS
A'lTORNEY OF RF.CORD, ERIC R. CLARK, AND THE CLERK OF THR
AllOVE-.1£NTlTL~l> COURT
NOTICE TS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

1.

T>efendanl, Rerryhill & Company, Inc., appeals against the above-named T"laintin:

Lo lhe Idaho Supreme Court from the Order Granling New Trial enlere<l on lhc 20th day of

August. 2013, by the Honorable Dennis Gol'I~ Senior District Judge.
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1
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2.

FAX

-

-

~003/005

AppeHanL hereby appeals as a matter of right to the Idaho Supreme Court Ii-om lhe

ahove-relerenced Order Granting New Trial, which is deemed to include all inLerlocuLory
judgments, orders and decrees a~ provided under [daho Appellate Rule l 7(e).
3.

The issue the AppcJlant intends to assert on appeal is that Lhe courl erred in

granting Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial Following Appeal and Remand.
4.

Appc1lant. Berryhill & Company, Tnc., has a righL Lo appeal since the Order

described in puragraph l above is an uppealablc order as defined in ldaho Appellate Rule
l .l(a)(5).

5.

Appellant requests the preparation of the reporter's transcript of the July 11, 2013

hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial Following Appeal and Remand in hard copy and
electronic format.
6.

Appellant requests a scanned copy of the clerk's record Lo include the following

documents in additjon to tho~e aulomaLically include<! under Idaho Appellate Rule 28:
(a)

a copy of the Memorandum in Support of Plaintilrs Motion ror New TriaJ

Jlollowing Appeal and Remand1 dated May l, 2013;
(b)

a copy of the Memorandum in Opposition

lo

PlainLilT's Motion Jor New

trial Following Appeal and Remand. dated June 4, 2013;
(c)

a copy of the Affidavit of Chris Pierce in Support orPiaintiffs Motion for

New Trial Following Appeal and Remand, dated June 4, 2013;

(cl)

a copy of Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for New

Trial Following Appeal and Remand, dated June 17, 2013;

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPF.AI, - 2
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7.

FAX

-

-

~004/005

Thereby t:erLily thal:

(a)

a copy of this Amended NoLic;e of Appeal has been served on the rcpo11cr:

(b)

the clerk or the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for

preparation of the rcpo1tcr's transcript of I.he July 11,201.1 heming on PlaintiJrs Motion
for New Trial Following Appeal and Remand.

(c)

the estimated fee forpreparaLion

or Lhl:! clerk's supplemental record has

heen pait.l;

(d)

the appellate filing lee has been paid; and

(e)

service of this amended notice has been made upon all pm Lies rel1uircd ~o

be served pursuant to Rule 20.
~

DA TED this -~. day of September, 2013

Daniel E. Williams
Attorney for Defendants/ AppellanL

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3
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Thereby cerli ly Lhat on this
day of September, 2013, T~erved a copy of the foregoing
instrument on opposing counsel as in<licalcd below:
Eric R. Cl ark
Clark & Associates, ALtorncys
P. 0. llox 2504
Eagle, ID 83616

Via Hand Ddivery

C?via Facsimile - 939-7136
Via U.S. Mail

and mailed a copy to the court reporter at:
Penny Tardiff
Ada County Tmnscripl Dept.

Ada County Comthouse
200 W. Front St., Room 4171
Boise, TD 83702

Daniel E. Williams

AMENDED NOTlCE OF AP.PEAL - 4
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OCT 25 2013
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By BRADLEY J. THIES

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDApreuTY

MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho
limited liability company
Supreme Court Docket
41338

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC.
an Idaho corporation, JOHN E.
BERRYHILL III and AMY
BERRYHILL, individually, and
as husband and wife,
Defendants-Appellants.

NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED

Notice is hereby given that on October 24, 2013,
I lodged a transcript 100 pages in length for the
above-referenced appeal with the District Court Clerk of
Ada County in the Fourth Judicial District.

7

{.1~

( S ~ u r e of Reporter)

Penny L.

Tardiff,

CSR

----------------- 10/24/2013-----------------------Hearing Date:

Ju 1 y 11,

2013
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
MOSELL EQUITIES, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Supreme Court Case No. 41338
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

vs.
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an
Idaho corporaton, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III
and AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and
as husband and wife,
Defendants-Appellants.

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify:
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the
course of this action.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this 25th day of October, 2013.

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCTOF
THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
MOSELL EQUITIES, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Supreme Court Case No. 41338
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

vs.
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an
Idaho corporaton, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III
and AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and
as husband and wife,
Defendants-Appellants.

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of
the following:
LIMITED CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:

DANIEL E. WILLIAMS

ERIC R. CLARK

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

BOISE, IDAHO

EAGLE, IDAHO

OCT 2 8 2013
Date of Service: - ------

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
MOSELL EQUITIES, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Supreme Court Case No. 41338
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD

vs.
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an
Idaho corporaton, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III
and AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and
as husband and wife,
Defendants-Appellants.

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing
record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true
and correct record of the pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28
of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as those requested by Counsels.
I FURTHER CERTIFY. that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the
22nd day of August, 2013.

CERTIFICATE TO RECORD
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